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Purpose and research questions: The aim of this study is to investigate the 
internal logic and the external context of Weber’s writings about objectivity. 
This is done both through a theoretical investigation of the texts and through 
using Weber as a case study of the relation between scientific and cultural 
values. What is the internal logic and the historical specificity of Weber’s 
account of objectivity? What role does the external social, political and cultural 
context play in shaping the form that these standards of objectivity have? 
How are questions of scientific methodology connected to wider cosmological 
issues? 
 
Method and material: Drawing upon perspectives from contemporary science 
studies as well as from Weber studies, I will develop an analytical model of 
variants of objectivity. This model is used for explicating the details of Weber’s 
version of objectivity, as well as clarifying what type of subject that it posits. I 
perform a close reading of parts of Weber’s methodology, examining his 
attempts to co-produce social and scientific order. The primary empirical 
material consists of a selection of Weber’s texts on methodology, science and 
politics. 
 
Main result: The historically specific form of Max Weber’s view of objectivity 
depends partly on his views of science, the self, politics and ethics. Some of the 
factors that take part in motivating and shaping his form of objectivity include 
Puritan asceticism, the German tradition of Bildung, and an agonistic 
understanding of politics. On multiple levels, objectivity is meant to safeguard 
autonomy. 
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When doing science, we use methods. Methods are supposed to guarantee the validity of the 
results we attain. Underlying every set of methods is a wider methodology – whether this is 
acknowledged or not – against which the methods in question gain their meaning and validity. 
The Oxford dictionary of sociology states the following: 
 
The principal concern of methodology is wider philosophy of science issues […], and the study 
of how, in practice, [researchers] go about their work, how they conduct investigations and 
assess evidence, how they decide what is true and false. (Scott & Marshall (eds.) 2005) 
 
A methodology can be said to contain answers to the question of how to carry out proper 
science. Different varieties will prescribe different methods, and these methods can not be 
judged entirely independently of methodological views. There is no outside point without 
implicit methodological presuppositions from which to judge the validity of science. In most 
methodologies, the question of how to achieve objectivity is of high priority. Objectivity is 
seen as one of the distinguishing marks of science, so it is important that the researchers are 
objective. What does that mean? Despite the vast amount of literature that deals with the 
concept of objectivity, there seems to have emerged no consensus as to how the concept 
should be treated, or what it refers to. Several discussants agree that it is important to 
recognise that the concept refers to several areas, but then disagree about what these are. In 
theoretical discussions of objectivity, we may analytically distinguish three different 
approaches: Critique, reconstruction and diversification.  
 
A) Critique of objectivity has been directed at such things as its objectifying tendencies, its 
instrumentality, its male bias, its disembodiment, the impossibility of a view from nowhere, 
the scientific attitude’s lack of emotion and concern for human values, etc. In the light of this 
criticism, some have concluded that belief in objectivity or parts thereof is naïve or harmful. 
A few see it as a dysfunctional ideal that needs to be wholly rejected, even though that is an 
unusual standpoint. B) Reconstruction of objectivity combines a measure of criticism with the 
claim that there are still valuable components to retain. It has been conceded that the critique 
is valid against an orthodox (instrumental, positivistic or androcentric) view of objectivity, 
but that it is possible to reformulate the concept in a form which avoids this critique. Several 
commentators have also noted the ethical and practical relevance of retaining a functioning 
concept of objectivity, and to avoid what seems as relativistic consequences of an all-out 
rejection.1 C) Diversification of the concept has followed from empirical studies of scientific 
                                                 
1 The defence of ’strong objectivity’ in the works of Sandra Harding, is one of the more well-known attempts at 
reconstruction. 
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practice, as well as historical investigations. This type of research has made the image of 
scientific activity and reasoning more complex, and deepened our understanding of the 
multitude of factors that contribute to knowledge production. Among other things, the results 
have shown that it is far from obvious just what the common sense terms ‘science’ and 
‘objectivity’ mean.2 According to philosopher of science Ian Hacking, one important finding 
of some of this research is that ‘epistemological concepts are not constants, free-standing 
ideas that are just there, timelessly.’ They have histories, and histories are always social 
processes, involving institutions, power, language, practices and subjects. (Hacking 2002: 8) 
Therefore, a sociological perspective can enrich the understanding also of methodological and 
epistemological issues. 
 
The diversification of objectivity is connected to an increased empirical interest generally in 
the guiding principles of scientific practice. Many acknowledge today that the aims found in 
methodologies are values. This discussion was opened up more generally by Thomas Kuhn, 
showing that criteria for theory choice are best understood as values. How do we judge the 
rationality or validity of a theory? We need some measure in order to judge the scientific 
merits of a theory or method. The criteria for doing this have to be weighed against each 
other, and there can be no method or formula to tell us precisely how to do that. New 
scientific values may emerge while some fall out of fashion, as e.g. utility has done. (Kuhn 
1977) Ideals of good science change over time, including the criteria by which we judge 
scientific competence and proper research. (Nilsson 2009)  
 
Some scholars refer to these scientific values as virtues since, just like moral virtues, they 
stand as regulative ideals for action, fostering the individuals who adhere to them and may 
also stand in tension to each other. The values in the service of scientific reason are also 
referred to as epistemic, cognitive, theoretical or intellectual values. Scientific values include 
(among others) empirical adequacy, simplicity, complexity, scope, accuracy, fruitfulness, 
certainty, internal coherence, external consistency with accepted theories, replicability, 
precision, utility, quantification and objectivity. Some have then wanted to make a distinction 
between the values present on the inside of science, which are intrinsic to scientific practice, 
and those on the outside. The outside values are then labelled cultural, contextual or non-
cognitive values. The nature and validity of the distinction between scientific and cultural 
values is currently debated. Some argue that cultural values affect how scientific values rise to 
prominence, and how they are weighed against each other. In different ways, Lorraine 
Daston, Stephen Toulmin and Helen Longino all hold that the distinction is not clear-cut and 
unambiguous. Others wish to strictly demarcate the two types of values from each other, in 
                                                 
2 I here have in mind sociologists such as Robert Proctor, Harry Collins, Trevor Pinch, and Bruno Latour, and 
historians such as Lorraine Daston, Peter Dear, Stephen Toulmin, Peter Galison, Theodore M. Porter, Simon 
Schaffer, Steven Shapin and Julie Robin Solomon. Also philosophers such as Ian Hacking and Hilary Putnam 
have produced useful works to this effect. 
order to keep culture and society outside of science. (Daston 1991, 1994, 1995, Daston & 
Galison 1992, 2007, Dear 1992, Kincaid, Dupré & Wylie (eds.) 2007, Lacey 1999, Longino 
1990, 1995, Porter 1994, Potter 1995) 
 
If we follow the insights developed by Toulmin, Daston, Galison, Longino and others, 
methodological debates appear as struggles over scientific values. Scientific values are 
stressed differently in different contexts, and always have to be weighed against each other. 
With this in mind, it would be interesting to see if other factors could be found that affect how 
the choice between scientific values is performed. Do cultural values play a part in this? If so, 
is this directly or indirectly? What is the relation between scientific and cultural values? The 
inside of science is normally seen as being free from cultural values and politics. We could 
well ask: Do methodologies have politics? 
 
Daston & Galison argue that epistemologies are motivated by fear of what improper 
knowledge might lead to. (Daston & Galison 2007: 49) Richard Bernstein introduced the term 
Cartesian anxiety to describe the concern for certainty that Descartes in the 17th century 
established as central for modern philosophy. Descartes was seriously worried about the 
consequences of not achieving certain knowledge. (Bernstein 1983: 16-19) Stephen Toulmin 
analyses this anxiety and the existential and political concerns that underlie it, to show how 
Descartes’ epistemology arises out of its socio-political context. To understand Descartes 
epistemology and the standards of scientific validity that it proposes, one must understand the 
cultural currents and political struggles at the time. (Toulmin 1990, see also 2001 and 1961) 
In a similar case, Julie Robin Solomon shows how Francis Bacon’s political concerns are 
present in his methodology. His conceptions of the royal and the real are closely linked. The 
authority of the monarch is transferred unto nature, or matter. His defence of good science is 
at the same time an advocacy of royal power. (Solomon 1998) 
 
Focus  
Against this background, it becomes interesting to turn to a classic theoretician of both 
scientific objectivity and the relation between science and values: Max Weber. If there are 
different varieties of objectivity, the question arises how Weber’s account fit in with others. 
What is specific about it, and how does it fare in the light of critical discussions? Weber’s 
objectivity focuses much on the relation between science, values and politics. How do the 
current debate and Weber’s account illuminate each other? Bernstein talks of a Cartesian 
anxiety for certainty. In a similar vein, we may talk of a Weberian anxiety for objectivity. 
When reading Weber it is clear that these are matters of grave importance for him. He argues 
passionately against erroneous methodologies and appears to be deeply concerned about 
objectivity. What are the anxieties and concerns behind his methodological writings? 
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Weber provides an interesting case since he is not the simple-minded positivist or objectivist 
that some believe, but shows instead how culture, concepts, imagination and passions are 
always present in science. Weber is seen by many as a landmark in the history of science, one 
of the very first to articulate an ideal that since then has gained widespread acceptance. It has 
been commonplace to hold up value-freedom as an ideal worth following in science. 
(Eliaeson 2002) The renowned Weber scholar Wilhelm Hennis claims that Weber’s ideal 
should be followed the way it is. (Hennis 1994) Sverker Gustavsson takes Weber to have 
provided the best solution so far of how to organise the relation between science and politics. 
(Gustavsson 1971) Gustavsson has had a large influence upon the last decades of Swedish 
science policy. (Elam & Glimell 2004) However, even if Weber’s account of scientific 
objectivity is sophisticated and complex, it still holds problems and tensions. Some of these 
become more clearly visible in the light of recent scholarship. Weber studies normally do not 
refer to the large body of research on objectivity and the relation between science and culture, 
even though it has direct relevance for the issues that Weber discussed. The questions of the 
relation between science and politics, and between rational knowledge seeking and cultural 
values, are as pertinent as ever. Recent developments in science studies have perhaps made 
them even more pressing. Weber is in focus in this study, but the findings should be relevant 
for contemporary issues of science and politics. 
 
Purpose 
The aim of this study is to investigate both the internal logic and the external context of 
Weber’s objectivity. My aim is to reconstruct Weber’s theoretical arguments and the 
presuppositions they rest upon to see how his account analytically fits together, while at the 
same time tracing some of the empirical causal connections, social interests and cultural 
influences that contributed to making his methodology of objectivity into what it is. Weber’s 
methodological writings are examined both to see what Weber theoretically says on the 
matter and what the case empirically shows us. The study thus has a twofold aim: 
 
• To re-examine Weber’s theoretical contribution, with the help of recent scholarship 
on objectivity and other scientific values and explicate its internal logic. This may 
expand our understanding of Weber’s concept of objectivity, showing its historical 
specificity and its strengths and weaknesses. 
• To situate Weber in his historical context and use this as a case study of the relation 
between cultural values and scientific values. This will clarify the relation between 
scientific text and social-historical context. This may illuminate the present debate, 




In the light of the contemporary debate, what can the theoretical contribution and the case of 
Weber’s objectivity tell us about objectivity and values in science? This overarching question 
can be divided into two sets, relating to the twofold aim. 
 
• Theoretical questions: What is the internal logic of Weber’s objectivity? How can we 
understand the specificity of its form? How does this differ from other versions? What 
type of subject is it related to? 
• Empirical questions: What role does the external context play? What does the case of 
Weber show about the relation between scientific and cultural values? Why does 
Weber’s objectivity have the form that it has? How is objectivity connected to society 
and culture? 
 
Methodological approach: Science and other parts of society 
In this thesis I will use the terminology of the inside and the outside of science. The inside of 
science is that which different actors believe properly belongs there, and the outside is that 
which is not part of science; that which is not scientific (whatever that might mean). Different 
actors define inside and outside in varying ways and the content of the terms differs. Some 
consider the distinction between science and non-science as fairly unproblematic, even though 
they may disagree about exactly where and how to draw the line. It is orthodox to demarcate 
the properly scientific and rational from the merely cultural, emotional or political. Many 
sociologists, including Weber, have conceived of the matter in this way. This applies also to 
some who have questioned the inside. David Bloor outlined two different explanatory 
approaches in the sociology of knowledge and the history of science: Internalism and 
externalism. The first accounts for scientific knowledge by referring to factors inside science, 
such as reason, rationality, good arguments and truth. The second, yet un-attempted, would 
instead causally explain scientific results, by referring to social factors outside of science, 
such as interests, group conflicts, cultural currents, religious influence, etc. (Bloor 1991)  
 
My approach is primarily inspired by Lorraine Daston (1995) and Stephen Toulmin. The 
latter gives numerous examples of how the standards of science and rationality depend on the 
socio-cultural context where they were first articulated. (Toulmin 1961, 1990, 2001) I am 
trying to avoid the dichotomy assumed when explaining science by referring either to internal 
reason or external causal processes. Instead, I aim to explicate how social processes, cultural 
currents and political interests situate and give form to Weber’s rational arguments. Unlike an 
internalist account, rationality and standards of science are not a priori assumed to be 
unrelated to culture and context. In every particular case it is an empirical question if and how 
they have something to do with each other. Unlike an externalist account, the rationality on 
the inside is not removed from the picture, but historicised and contextualised. 
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Please note that even though we are looking for external factors, that is only part of the story. 
Even if we were to give psychologizing answers, such as ‘Weber advocated objectivity 
because he was an anal personality with weak nerves’, or sociologizing answers such as 
‘Weber advocated objectivity because he was younger/German/bourgeois’, these answers 
would not explain away the need for understanding the internal rationality. To think that one 
could provide such answers and stop there, would be to give in to reductionism. Reductionist 
versions of these explanations (sometimes referred to as psychologism or sociologism) either 
leave all matters found on the inside of science completely untouched, including those of 
validity and rationality, or they risk reducing science to outside alone. The question is not just 
if we can find external (cultural, social, psychological) factors that motivate scientific activity. 
There is widespread agreement that this is the case. The question is if these external factors 
affect how science is practiced. Do they contribute to forming the very standards of objectivity 
that Weber proposes? Does their presence make a difference on the inside? Can we find 
external factors that not just motivate an interest in methodology, but which also to a degree 
affect the design of this methodology?  
 
In modern societies, the social institution of science has come to play an increasingly large 
role. It would be misleading to speak of a relation between science and society. The last 30 
years of science studies has shown clearly that science is very much a part of society. Science 
is not a disconnected culture-free activity which floats above or outside. It rests in society. 
The relation between science and politics can be seen as a relation between two social 
institutions within society. We may speak of a relation between science and the rest of 
society. It is now fairly common to speak of an entanglement between science and the rest of 
culture and society, even though there is no general agreement of how to describe the precise 
nature of this entanglement. Sheila Jasanoff uses the term co-production to refer to the way 
that elements of science, society and culture are intertwined and develop together. She argues 
that most of the work within science studies today can be interpreted as studying different 
aspects of co-production. (Jasanoff 2004) A pioneering work on how scientific order and 
social order are established as two sides of the same process, is Steven Shapin’s and Simon 
Schaffer’s Leviathan and the air-pump. They show how methodologies draw boundaries 
between different fields of reality, ordering and dividing up the world. (Shapin & Schaffer 
1984) 
 
Both sociologists and anthropologists study the kind of distinctions and boundaries that actors 
make, regarding social institutions as well as the things that exist in the world. When 
describing how actors’ different beliefs and values are internally related and hang together as 
a whole, and how they divide up reality into categories, it is common to speak of cosmology. 
To speak of a world-view as a whole does not mean that this whole is necessarily free from 
tensions and internal contradictions, only that practices, beliefs and values are related and 
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cohere to a degree. This approach can be applied also to science. (Sahlins 1996, Latour 1993, 
Johansson 2008)  
 
The background assumptions that scientists have about entities and natural order, and which 
inform their studies and modes of explanations, often have the character of cosmological 
assumptions. (Sismondo 1996, Longino 1990, Toulmin 1961) A cosmology gives sense and 
meaning to the practices of a culture, telling actors what it is that they do and why. This 
applies also to Weber’s description of objectivity. As this study has found, his prescription of 
objective conduct is fully intelligible only when it is viewed as part of a wider cosmology 




Although the purpose and the research questions are divided in two, relating to inside and 
outside, the separation between two tasks lies mainly on an analytical level. In practice I will 
interweave these. The two sets of questions will be treated in a unified account, although the 
focus is initially more on the first and gradually shifts towards the second. I will perform a 
case study of Weber’s writings about objectivity. This gives a historical example of the 
relations between objectivity, value-freedom, culture and politics. I will combine a close 
reading of the texts, using theoretical perspectives from recent science studies as a guide, with 
readings of secondary literature about Weber and his social-historical context. Three types of 
literature are used, that provide the following for the study: 
• Weber’s own writings: Primary empirical material. 
• Science studies: Analytical perspectives and tools. 
• Weber studies: Secondary empirical material (for contextualisation) and analytical 
perspectives. 
 
I am not investigating a piece of scientific work, but a piece of methodology. This study is not 
doing sociology of knowledge, but sociology of theory of knowledge (epistemology). The 
process may analytically be broken down into the following steps: 
 
Chapter 2:  The construction of an analytical model showing four areas of different  
meanings of the term ‘objectivity’. Two of these areas belong to the scientific  
process – conduct and methods – and thus clearly contain scientific values. 
Chapter 3:  A close description of Weber’s ideas about objectivity, to see which parts of t
  he analytical model that apply. This will tell us which scientific values that  
Weber’s objectivity can be subdivided into, and how these relate to each other. 
Chapter 4:  Reconstruction of the type of subject that may live up to the standards of the  
objective scientist. This is done by surveying what Weber says explicitly, and  
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which aspects of the subject his objectivity negates. 
Chapter 5: Tracing the cultural, ethical and political connections to Weber’s views of  
science and self. For this task I will mainly use secondary literature. 
 
When scrutinising Weber’s texts with newly developed theoretical tools, we will see in 
greater detail what it is that Weber tells us about the nature of science and objectivity 
(theoretical questions). When tracing the connections between Weber’s theories and their 
context, we will see what the case study shows us about these matters (empirical questions). 
 
Disposition 
I have chosen not to have a separate section on previous research. To try to summarize the 
thousands of items written on Weber would be pointless. Even to select just the ones most 
relevant for the task ahead would require entire volumes. Instead, I introduce previous works 
in the appropriate place in the text, when I draw upon them. Chapter 2 could be seen as both 
summarizing relevant previous research in science studies, and doing preliminary theoretical 
work needed for the empirical investigation in the succeeding chapters. This chapter will 
outline the contemporary discussion on objectivity and scientific values, and provide tools 
which I will later use. A few theoretical perspectives will be introduced later when they are 
needed, but I have found it unnecessary and confusing to mention everything at once. 
Chapters 3 through 5 outline the empirical investigation of text and context, divided into the 
three headings of Science, Self and Society. These chapters gradually widen the scope of the 
investigation from the more scientifically internal to the more external. Each chapter focuses 
on a category which is important to Weber: Science, the self and politics. A fourth field of 
great importance to Weber is ethics, which is mentioned mainly in chapters 3 and 5. Finally, 
chapter 6 summarises the findings. This will clarify how Weber’s vision of objectivity is 
connected to his understanding of science, self and society; how his methodology is part of 
his personal cosmology. 
 
Empirical material 
The main focus will be on the following texts: Die “Objektivität” sozialwissenschaftlicher 
und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis (The ”Objectivity” of knowledge in social science and social 
policy), Der Sinn der “Wertfreiheit” der soziologischen und ökonomischen Wissenschaften 
(The meaning of ‘value-freedom’ in the sciences of sociology and economics), Wissenschaft 
als Beruf (Science as vocation/calling), Politik als Beruf (Politics as vocation/calling).3 
 
                                                 
3 I have chosen not to use the standard translations of these titles, for clarifying reasons. Der Sinn der 
“Wertfreiheit” is translated in MSS as ‘The meaning of “Ethical neutrality” in sociology and economics’. I find 
this to be directly misleading, since Weber sharply demarcates ethics from values. Furthermore, it is impossible 
for the scientist to stay neutral, but he may abstain from passing judgements on values. See chapter 3. 
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The first two texts contain Weber’s systematic treatments of matters of objectivity and value-
freedom, even though he mentions these matters also in other places. These texts are 
considered central among Weber’s methodological works. (See e.g. MSS v-vi) The two 
second texts describe how Weber conceives of the roles of the scientist and the politician 
respectively. They are included since Weber sees the scientist as well as science as a whole in 
contrast to the politician and politics. Since I am focusing on objectivity as practice, questions 
of understanding, explanation, causality and construction of ideal types lie outside the focus 
of this study.4 When the secondary literature has pointed me to interesting passages in other 
places in Weber’s works, I have often followed these clues.  
 
As a help to understanding the original texts, I have read Swedish and English translations. As 
far as I can judge, the Swedish translations lie closer to the German originals in meaning and 
are therefore preferred over the English ones.5 Apart from all the sections that I make 
references to, I have read the translations more closely than the originals, due to the time it 
takes me to read German. When citing, I have sometimes found the translations in MSS to be 
misleading and instead made my own. 
 
Secondary literature: There is a very large number of publications about Weber. The texts 
that I have used the most are Boglind, Eliaeson & Månson (1993), Bruun (2007), Ciaffa 
(1998), Goldman (1988), Hennis (1994), Owen (1994), Proctor (1991), Ringer (1997, 2004). 
Further evidence and understanding has been gathered from Bosch (1962), Eliaeson (2000, 
2002), Gouldner (1964), Honigsheim (1968) Lassman (2000), Turner & Factor (1984) and the 
companion edited by Turner (2000).  
 
 
2. Objectivity today 
 
In this chapter I will go through some of the contemporary research on objectivity and 
scientific values. The first section aims to achieve some clarity regarding what objectivity can 
be, and to construct an analytical model for later use. The second section outlines the 
connection between objectivity and the self as a moral entity, subject to active self-formation. 
It also aims to show how objectivity is internally related to fears of the intruding self and what 
bad science might lead to. 
                                                 
4 For excellent studies on those topics see Ringer 1997 or Agevall 1999. 
5 I have encountered a number of problems in the translations made in 1949 by Edward A. Shils & Henry A. 
Finch (in MSS), but it would lead too far to go into that here. Just as an example, they sometimes translate 
‘Beruf’ as ‘professional task’, thereby completely missing its existential and valuational dimensions as calling. 
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2.1 The abundance of objectivities 
Within science there have always been debates over how to be scientific. In the 19th century, 
an increasing number of scientists came to argue for the idea that good science must be 
objective science. That ‘objectivity’ today has become more or less synonymous with ‘good 
science’ tell us something about their success. In order to make possible an investigation of 
objectivity we must not equate it with good science per se. The term is burdened with a lot of 
semantic confusion. ‘Objective’ is often used as meaning ‘valid’, ‘rational’, ‘true’ or ‘real’, or 
all at once. Common sense meanings of the term include meanings such as ‘an account free 
from all subjective influence’ or ‘a representation of the true nature of things’, or simply 
‘really real and not made up’. However, objectivity can be shown to stand for a specific 
version of scientific rationality, validity and good science. Not only that, it comes in different 
varieties, each with a history of its own. Historians tell us that ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ 
have always been mirror concepts, although their meanings have changed drastically over the 
centuries. (Daston & Galison 2007) Originally, ‘subjective’ did not refer to individual 
subjects. It was not until the eighteenth century that ‘subjective’ acquired its present-day 
meaning of having to do with the single mind. (Lübcke 1988: 530) As an example from 
earlier times, Kant is clear to distinguish ‘subjektiv’ from ‘privat’, where the first refers to 
that which is common to all humans, and the second to the idiosyncratic and personal. 
(Liedman 2006: 239)6 Exactly what criteria should be met for objectivity has differed 
significantly. The one thing most of its varying proponents agree on is that it opposes 
subjectivity. Subcomponents of objective behaviour have a mainly negative character. Their 
chief merit lies in them not being subjective, albeit in different ways.  
 
Objectivity is related to subjectivity as wax to seal, as hollow imprint to the bolder and more 
solid features of subjectivity. Each of the several components of objectivity opposes a distinct 
form of subjectivity; each is defined by censuring some (by no means all) aspects of the 
personal. (Daston & Galison 1992: 82) 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, in recent years the concept has undergone a diversification. 
A growing body of work shows how several components and ideas have been discussed under 
the heading of ‘objectivity’. The scientific virtue of objectivity can be subdivided into a whole 
set of scientific values. Different ideals of objectivity include different sets of guiding values 
that must be adhered to in order for scientific practice to count as objective. Objectivity is thus 
not a single value, but a whole family of related scientific values. As means of clarification, 
we could ask firstly what the potential candidates for being objective are; what types of things 
the concept may be applied to? Second, how can these be objective; what types of objectivity 
are there? 
                                                 




What can be objective? 
R W Newell claims in Objectivity, empiricism and truth that objectivity refers to two areas, 
‘the status of things’ and ‘the quality of human behavior’. The first area is ontological and 
concerns the real existence of objects. In this sense, the term is used to denote that things exist 
independently of human minds altogether, alternatively independent of singular minds. The 
second area concerns a certain type of conduct. The term here has a wholly different meaning. 
To be objective in this sense is to act in accordance with a certain attitude or cognitive 
dictum: disinterestedness, impartiality, detachment, freedom from emotion, rationality, etc. 
(Newell 1986: 17) In Rethinking objectivity, Alan Megill sums up what has been claimed to 
be objective in science. 
• The individual researcher 
• Methods or models 
• The results of knowledge production (Megill 1994b: 8) 
 
Megill’s first two points are both concerned with how science is done, i.e. with behaviour and 
not with ontology. Objectivity in these two is something that is practiced, not a property of 
things. The third area, results, are normally seen to gain their status of objectivity through the 
correct practice, i.e. correct scientific behaviour in methods and conduct. If we combine what 
Newell and Megill are saying, we get four areas that can be objective: Things, scientific 
results, methods and researcher conduct. ‘Things’ concern ontology, while the other three 
concern epistemology. Or put another way, ‘things’ can refer to any type of entity, while the 
other three in varying ways refer to science. The ontological sense is a general kind of 
philosophical objectivity, while the other three concern scientific objectivity. My focus in this 
thesis will be on one of these four, the practice of objectivity through correct conduct by the 
individual researcher; how objectivity is practiced by actual persons.7 [Please see appendix]  
 
Many discussants conflate ontological issues with epistemological ones, e.g. by 
indiscriminately referring to “the objectivity of science”, speaking of existence of entities, 
truth, accurate representation and correct behaviour all at once. However, once we have 
separated these four areas it becomes clear that objectivity have different meanings in each of 
them. When referring to ‘the objectivity of science’ we must make clear whether we refer to 
results, methods or conduct, and also in what way. These areas may all be debated separately. 
As an example, it is far from obvious that a scientific account free from all subjective 
idiosyncrasies would necessarily capture the mind-independently existing properties of 
objects. It is further instructive to keep different aspects of cognitive conduct apart. Even if 
some of these may overlap, they can still be advocated separately. As we shall see later, 
                                                 
7 When objectivity is mentioned in law or journalism it is almost exclusively in the meaning of conduct. 
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Weber’s type of objectivity does not ban interpretation and presuppositions, but value-
judgments, emotions and personal interests. 
 
The historians of science Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison argue that most discussions of 
objectivity – whether the concept is defended, criticised or reconstructed – treat it in an 
ahistorical way. It is commonly viewed as if it has always been the same thing with the same 
connotations. Instead, in a number of works they show how objectivity as term, ideas and 
practices have emerged and transformed throughout history. Every version of objectivity 
belongs with specific methods, specific ethics and specific metaphysics. (Daston & Galison 
2007: 124) Daston & Galison investigate the different senses of acting in an objective 
manner, and the types of selves these behaviours take part in shaping. The differing 
components of objectivity cannot only be distinguished through conceptual analysis but also 
through concrete separate histories of scientific ideals and practices. It is not only one concept 
with several meanings; it is in fact several concepts, which have come to be discussed under 
the same heading. (Daston 1991, 1994, 1995, Daston & Galison 1992, 2007) Just like Newell, 
they see the distinction between objectivity-as-existence and objectivity-as-behaviour as 
having essential importance for understanding the concept. If we keep ontological and 
epistemological meanings of the term apart, we are able to investigate them better. 
 
Not just philosophers but also sociologists often use the term ‘objective’ in its ontological 
sense, where it is more or less synonymous to ‘real’ or ‘given’. ‘Objective’ is used to denote 
that which does not rely on experience; at least not a singular person’s. Some sociologists, 
such as Berger & Luckmann, use ‘objective’ in the sense of ‘given’, or ‘independent of the 
singular individual’. (1966) To make things objective is commonly understood as making 
structures or other entities less dependent on individual minds. Firstly, this means increasing 
their stability and durability. Secondly, it means expanding their validity, thus making them 
more universal. Thirdly, it can mean expanding their existence making them more prevalent, 
as in the case of spreading a social institution.8 Some theorists have instead preferred the term 
‘intersubjective’. It is used to denote that the existence of entities (or the validity of results) 
rely on human subjects, but only as a collective. The ontological sense of ‘objectivity’, which 
refers to properties of things, will be discussed no further in this study. The concern here is 
with Weber’s prescriptions of objectivity, i.e. the prescribed cognitive conduct. Objectivity as 
a methodological principle is something which the researcher follows. It is not a property of 
things or results, but of the research practice itself. 
 
How can it be objective? 
To be objective is to keep the subject outside. What does this mean? What different meanings 
may be discerned in the bundled contemporary usage of the term? ‘Objective’ is sometimes 
                                                 
8 We find varieties of ‘making things objective’ in e.g. Berger & Luckman 1966; Bourdieu 1999, Latour 1987. 
used as a synonym for ‘real’ and sometimes for ‘true’, but it has distinct meanings of its own. 
The growing number of empirical studies into the origins of scientific objectivity link it to, 
among other things, disinterestedness, quantification, standards of evidence, self-inscribing 
instruments, procedures of observation, etc. (Daston 1992, 1994, 1995, Daston & Galison 
1992, 2007, Dear 1992, Porter 1992, 1994, Proctor 1991, Shapin 1994, Solomon 1998) Apart 
from these more recent empirical works, there is of course a staggering amount of 
philosophical and methodological debate concerning objectivity. I have surveyed a sample of 
this literature to find different meanings of the term ‘objectivity’. (Haraway 1988, Kuhn 1977, 
Kvale 1997: 64-66, Lloyd 1995, Megill (ed.) 1994a, Newell 1986, Popper 1972, Potter 1995, 
Rorty 2009: 333-34, Skeggs 1997: ch. 1, Toulmin 2001: 96) Dividing these into the four areas 
distinguished above, I have constructed a conceptual family tree.  This analytical model is 
meant to give an overview of some of the different meanings that at one time or another have 
been ascribed to objectivity. Each box should be understood as an ideal type of an aspect of 
objectivity, constructed as a theoretical concept since (as Weber says of ideal types) it 
captures elements of reality that are significant in their particularity (Eigenart). (GAW 192, 
VOP 141) In order to do this I have tried to analytically purify the different aspects. That is 
why neither of the popular candidates detachment nor impartiality are listed here. Both of 
them can be subdivided further, and they are too imprecise. Detachment e.g. applies to Non-
intervention, Freedom from emotions, and Disinterestedness, and maybe even to Value-
freedom. I am not claiming that this list is exhaustive, or the only possible way to categorise 
these aspects. Hopefully, this analytical model will serve to clarify what the theoretical issue. 
It will be used for examining Weber’s writings. [Please see appendix] 
 
There is a clear value in keeping these aspects apart, since they stand for different values and 
lead to different practices. Critique against some of them completely misses the target when it 
comes to others. Neither is it given that they all belong together. Even if some components 
are closely related and partly overlapping, they may enter the scene independently. There is 
no single measure to tell which of these ideals of objectivity is “more objective”. The varieties 
of objectivity described here are not just more or less objective on a quantitative scale, they 
are qualitatively different. This has important implications for all talk of objectivity. In those 
cases where it is at all meaningful to compare or measure if one thing is more objective than 
another, it must be clarified which aspect among the multifarious meanings of the term that is 
aimed at. Following this diversification, objectivity appears as a rather nebulous concept with 
meanings that are more or less compatible or contradictory. The issues of critique, defence 
and reconstruction become reconfigured. One must clarify what components to reject or keep. 
 
The two areas that concern the scientific process – conduct and methods – can both be 
described as scientific values. All of these describe things valued in ‘objective science’. When 
Daston & Galison discuss scientific virtues, they include values regarding both conduct and 
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methods. I believe there is a value in distinguishing these, since the conduct of cognitive 
practices mainly dictates what the researcher should not do, whereas methods are things that 
should be done. The first is a list of prohibitions while the second consists of endorsements. 
Furthermore, cognitive conduct directly concerns the inner behaviour of subjects – their 
virtuous character. Methods are in a sense external to the researcher since they are normally 
carried out with the help of tools, and do not concern morality in the same way. Weber’s 
concept of objectivity mostly concerns proper conduct. It involves methods only to the degree 
that he discusses how to construct proper analytical concepts – ideal types. This is dealt well 
with by Agevall (1999) and Ringer (1997) and is not touched upon further here. 
 
To sum up this first section, we have seen that objectivity has many meanings and stand for a 
whole family of scientific values. Some of these refer to the conduct of the researcher. 
Objectivity always has a mirror image in subjective behaviour that should be avoided. It 
comes with a (normative) ideal of the objective scientist, and the practices which this ideal 
researcher performs. Objectivity prescribes a certain type of subject who acts and thinks in the 
correct manner. The analytical model developed here will later be used to expound Weber’s 
objectivity and its corresponding self. 
2.2 The virtue of objectivity and the shaping of the scientific self 
In this section, I will describe how ideals of objectivity are always connected to background 
assumptions of mental composition as well as ideas about virtuous character. A new 
conception of the self that developed in the 19th century gave rise to new epistemological 
anxieties, which objectivity was supposed to counteract. Ideals of scientific conduct shifted 
and a new scientific persona arrived on the scene: The objective scientist. 
 
The virtuous self and the fear of bad science 
Stephen Gaukroger writes that during the Enlightenment, the persona of the natural 
philosopher (scientist) changed. Science came to be seen as the sole bearer of the standards of 
rationality. Scientists came to monopolise reason, and be the only ones allowed to speak in its 
name. They could do so since they embodied an intellectual morality. Natural philosophers 
developed a special role as trustworthy witnesses. They were the sole interpreters of reason; 
once a privilege of the theologians. Along with the special standing of the scientist developed 
the idea that there was a specific virtue that set them apart from others: intellectual honesty. 
This had not been the case with the scholastic philosophers but was a new notion. (Gaukroger 
2006) Steven Shapin argues that trust and personal virtue are essential components in modern 
science. (Shapin 1994, 2008)  
 
From Gaukroger’s and Shapin’s historical point of view, it seems that the virtuous character 
of the scientist has always been an important part of science. Science does not only rely upon 
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impersonal methods. Also in the classical accounts of science by Max Weber and Robert 
Merton, the moral character of the scientist is important. There is a scientific ethos that 
dictates how sound science is practiced. However, it remains a bone of contention whether 
science can produce results that bear no trace of the persons involved. 
 
Daston & Galison use the term epistemic virtue to capture the nature of scientific values. They 
function as regulative ideals for knowledge seeking, and guide scientific practice. Among 
these we find e.g. Truth, Objectivity, Certainty, Precision, and Replicability. The reason for 
calling these virtues is that they fuse a moral ethos with epistemology. The questions of 
correct conduct and proper science are intrinsically linked. ‘Ethos was explicitly wedded to 
epistemology in the quest for truth or objectivity or accuracy. Far from eliminating the self in 
the pursuit of scientific knowledge, each of the epistemic virtues depended on the cultivation 
of certain character traits at the expense of others.’ (Daston & Galison 2007: 204)  
 
Just like moral virtues, the scientific ones aim at the same ultimate goal (in this case not The 
Good but Knowledge), but may actually conflict in concrete situations. There is no one way 
of combining and weighing them against each other, just as in the case of moral virtues. If a 
result is made more Precise it may be less Replicable. Similarly, to aim for Objectivity is 
sometimes done at the expense of Truth. Many acknowledge that scientific objectivity does 
not guarantee truth. Daston & Galison go a step further and show how it can actually stand in 
opposition to truth. As an illustration, when objectivity developed as a virtue of its own in the 
19th century, it was explicitly opposed to the older ideal of unveiling the essences of nature to 
find the Truth. The new-styled objective scientists argued against the virtues of the 
Enlightenment wise sage and his unique skills, whose knowledge-seeking they deemed as far 
too subjective. (ibid. ch. 4)  
 
Scientific virtues have separate histories and are stressed differently in different scientific 
communities and cultures. (ibid. 33) Epistemic virtues tell the researchers how they should 
behave in order to seek knowledge. How to remove obstacles to knowledge? Objectivity is 
one such answer, or rather, a whole family of answers. Many contemporary discussions of 
objectivity take for granted that it necessarily has to do with truth and certainty, but this has 
not always been the case. Even though matters of Truth, Objectivity, Certainty, Validity, etc. 
are often conflated, these ideals can be traced back through different historical paths. As we 
shall see, also in Weber’s usage many meanings are layered upon each other. 
 
The specificity of scientific behaviour lies not in a descriptive or instrumental methodology, 
but in an intellectual morality. (Gaukroger 2006) Objectivity is not so much about methods as 
it is about normativity. One cannot understand the calls for objective behaviour without 
seeing that those prescriptions are not pragmatic how-to advice, but moral prescriptions. The 
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scientific self stands for a certain morality, an ethos. (Daston & Galison 2007: 39-40) As 
mentioned in the introduction, some scholars argue that epistemology has always been driven 
by morality and that it is strongly linked to moral concerns, even fear. Many of these fears are 
at bottom political and/or existential. Methodological and political concerns sometimes 
appear as two sides of the same coin, since they both derive from the world view of the 
scientists. In every epistemology there are obstacles and threats to knowledge. Methodology 
provides the answers to how to overcome those obstacles and remove those threats. Every 
methodology has its virtues and its vices. This should be understood quite literally. What 
happens if science is not performed properly? Which normative concerns motivate a specific 
methodology? How to carry out proper science? That depends on what threats need to be 
avoided. How to be properly scientific? That depends on what virtues and vices the 
methodology embodies.  
 
That proper science is motivated not only by rationality but also by values is in line with what 
contemporary research in cognitive science shows. Through drawing upon the quickly 
expanding bulk of case studies and research within cognitive science, Antonio Damasio 
shows how rationality is unable to motivate anything by itself. Contrary to the received view 
that emotions are only in opposition to rationality, cognitive science demonstrates how feeling 
and rational thought operate together. Emotions are necessary to motivate rational thinking. 
(Damasio 1999) Pure rationality does not provide the motivation for anything, only values 
and emotions do. Whenever someone says ‘It is important that we do x’, there is a value or an 
emotion motivating x. Presently there is an emerging field in sociology studying how 
emotions are present in all aspects of social life, both in shaping and motivating our projects. 
(Wettergren, Starrin & Lindgren 2008) Scientific methodology is no exception to this. Any 
specific methodology embodies various desires and anxieties, specifically regarding the 
nature of knowledge and scientific practice. By conceding this we are certainly not giving in 
to relativism or “anything goes”. Also from philosophy we may draw some support for this. 
Charles Taylor shows how our emotions may be rational as well as irrational. Some of our 
feelings can be rational. (Taylor 1995) A dividing line between the rational and the irrational 
is not identical to the line between thoughts and feelings. 
 
The question still remains what the relation is between scientific and cultural values. Can the 
intellectual morality which sets science apart be understood as arising only from within 
science? Is it shaped mostly by concerns for truth and rationality? Does the outside of science 
contribute to shaping scientific values in any other way than just to create fertile conditions 
for rational science? Can the surrounding society only help or hinder good science, or does it 
also affect the form of science, i.e. how good science is performed? 
 
Objectivity as the moral of self-restraint 
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Daston & Galison tell us that objectivity rose to prominence in the mid-nineteenth century. 
The main epistemological worry for objectivity is the intrusion of the researcher’s own self.  
What distinguishes objectivity as an epistemic virtue is that it aims for the elimination of 
subjectivity. The self should not intervene into the scientific process and interpret, add or 
evaluate. The scientific results should bear no mark of the specific individuals who carried out 
the research. All idiosyncracies should be eliminated. Objectivity paints an ideal picture not 
only of scientific practice but also of the self who performs this. 
 
Changing conceptions of the scientific self is always related to other views of self present in 
the same era. Objectivity as specific scientific virtue was unthinkable before the conception of 
the human self as subject had emerged. To contemporary ears this may sound strange, but the 
self has not always been conceived as a subject. ‘Subject’ is a 19th century notion. (Seigel 
2005, Mauss 1985) This new type of self is unique and has depth: subjectivity. Daston & 
Galison describe this new self as dynamic and centred on the will. Deep inside there are inner 
conflicts which the self has to negotiate. Irrationality, imagination and value judgments are 
threats to keep at bay. The subject’s main characteristic is that it is thinking and active, 
struggling for control and self-discipline. The ideal of objectivity presupposes a view of the 
self as idiosyncratic and unique. This subject could run amok and disturb the passive 
observation and rational cognition of the scientific process unless the will tightly constrains 
itself. The view of the self as a dynamic will-driven subject can be opposed to e.g. the 
Enlightenment self, whose main characteristic was perception. This self was a loose aggregate 
of mental faculties, ruled by reason. Its main epistemic risk was not to exert too much 
influence on the scientific process, but too little. The Enlightenment self was seen as at risk of 
becoming too impressionable and passive. Later when the self becomes posed as the main 
obstacle to scientific knowledge, objectivity as a scientific virtue is articulated, to provide the 
remedy and foster the scientific self. (Daston & Galison 2007: ch. 1 & 4) The polar opposite 
of the scientist is the artist. In the field of art, we get the artistic self and in the field of science 
we get the objective scientific self. These are different responses to the more general shift in 
eighteenth-century self-conception. Both share the underlying conception of the self as 
subjectivity, although the artist endorses his subjectivity whereas the scientist tries to restrain 
it. Imagination, passion, and to go where the inspiration leads were virtues for the artist but 
vices for the objective scientist. (ibid. 37-38, 246-47) 
 
What is specific about the scientific ideal of objectivity is that it has a mainly negative 
character; its most striking feature is to negate the human subject. Most usages of the term 
signify a way and a will to keep the individual subject form interfering with the knowledge 
process. The subject is to be disciplined and kept in check. This requires strong willpower. 
Daston & Galison describe the ideal of objectivity as enforcing a ‘will to willessness’. The 
subject must not be active and engaged, but restrain itself and remain a passive observer. In 
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descriptions of objectivity there are many commands to abstain, from judgements, emotions, 
pre-conceived notions, interpretations, etc. To follow the virtue of objectivity is to refrain 
from doing a whole list of things. Talk of objectivity is often highly morally charged. It does 
not consist of technical and methodological advice but of ethical commands: Thou shalt not! 
The researching subject must follow a harsh regime of self-discipline. It must stay in control 
of itself, actively engaged in not being engaged. The paradox here is that for knowledge to be 
more objective, the researcher must pay enormous concentration to its antithesis – the subject. 
In the practice of objective science, careful attention is paid to the researchers own self. The 
subject must carefully and continuously negate itself. Objective knowledge production is a 
painstaking form of self-management. This takes place mainly through a set of cognitive 
practices, mostly aimed at abstinence, control and self-negation. 
 
‘Epistemic virtues earn their right to be called virtues by molding the self, and the ways they 
do so parallel and overlap with the ways epistemology is translated into science.’ (Daston & 
Galison 2007:41) Epistemology consists not only of free-floating philosophical analysis. It 
becomes translated into scientific practice. In what ways are ideas about objectivity translated 
into ways of working, thinking and going about the daily life as scientist? Objectivity 
prescribes a list of dos and don’ts. It becomes not only an abstract ideal but a code of conduct. 
Some methods are objective and should be used, while others are not. Some behaviour and 
thinking is in accordance with objectivity, while some is forbidden and should be avoided. So 
the ideal of objectivity becomes translated into a set of directives. Do this! Don’t do that! 
Avoid this! Refrain from doing that! Objectivity thus shapes scientific practice. Practice in 
turn, is essential in forming the kind of persons we come to be. Norms and practices are part 
of what constitute us as persons. To tell scientists to behave objectively is to command them 
to behave in a certain way, to think correctly, and to be a specific type of person. To do what 
objectivity prescribes is at once to practice objectivity and to exercise the scientific self. The 
ideals and practices of objectivity contribute to shaping specific personas – ideal types of the 
self – as well as shaping the actual people striving to live up to these personas. With the rise 
of objectivity as a scientific virtue, a new type of person arrives on the scene: The objective 
researcher. It is a new kind of person, a new resource for production of human subjectivity. 
(Hacking 2002: ch. 6) With the emergence of objectivity a new human entity is thus created. 
 
To sum up, objectivity presupposes a certain view of the human self, which gives rise to a 
moral problematic. The virtue of objectivity gives an answer on how to overcome this 
obstacle to knowledge. A certain type of conduct is needed in order for the subject not to pose 
a problem. Thus, it fosters a certain type of self through the self-discipline of objective 
practice. It is plausible to believe that these techniques of conduct and action also shape the 
selves of those who practice them. As Daston & Galison put it, epistemic virtues mould the 
self. What kind of self is the problem which Weber’s objectivity strives to eliminate, and what 
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kind of self do his prescriptions mould? To answer this we must first take a closer look at 
what exactly Weber says on the matter. 
 
 
3. Science: Weber’s scientific objectivity 
 
If objectivity has many different components and is not a unified concept, which parts do we 
find in Weber? This chapter will first outline how Weber generally conceived of science and 
its relation to culture, before focusing in on the design of Weber’s objectivity. 
3.1 Science and culture 
Weber’s usage of the terms ‘objective’ and ‘objectivity’ (as in many other 20th century 
usages) is a bundle of many different meanings. Sometimes it refers to conduct, sometimes to 
the world, sometimes to validity, sometimes to a perspective from nowhere. Several of these 
meanings Weber deems to be impossible, which is why he always writes the term within 
citation marks.9 The dominant meaning of objectivity as ‘independent of everything 
subjective’ is something which Weber does not believe in. But there is one type of objectivity 
that is possible: the ideal of value-freedom. The more metaphysical versions of objectivity are 
unfounded, but it is possible to behave in a value-free manner. That is as much objectivity as 
we can hope to achieve. So even though Weber uses the adjective ‘objective’ in several 
different ways, there is a more or less distinct concept of scientific objectivity to be found. It 
needs however to be differentiated from the occasions where the term is used more generally, 
referring to validity, existence, truth or facticity. 
 
One of the main sources for Weber’s ideas on objectivity is his 1904 essay The ”Objectivity” 
of knowledge in social science and social policy.10 Hans Henrik Bruun remarks that this essay 
is mostly about how objectivity is not to be understood: it focuses on subjectivity. (Bruun 
2007: 28) This squares perfectly with what Daston & Galison say about objectivity in general. 
The general form of the virtue of objectivity is that it negates subjectivity and is defined in 
direct opposition to it. Objectivity as scientific virtue has direct bearing on the self by banning 
parts of it from the scientific process. The battle for objectivity is obsessed with the dangers 
of subjectivity. (Daston & Galison 2007) This is very true also regarding Weber, although he 
does not oppose the same aspects of subjectivity as naturalist versions of objectivity do. He 
argues that science may never be objective in the strong sense, since it always depends on 
subjective premises: A culturally shaped perspective, and an interest in the world, given by 
our cultural values. There is no single “objective” scientific perspective, especially not one 
                                                 
9 In German, no differentiation is made between ‘citation marks’ and “scare quotes“. 
10 In Weber’s time, the word ‘Wissenschaft referred to all forms of systematic knowledge’. (Ringer 1997:8) I 
will here consistently translate it as ‘science’.  
free from culture. The very activity of science depends on a previous value-choice: That truth 
and scientific knowledge are important and worth striving for, in the calling of the scientist. 
Furthermore, problems to be investigated are selected on the basis of values. These are the 
inevitable subjective prerequisites for any scientific enterprise. Science may nevertheless aim 
for universal validity, in both its empirical investigations and its logical analyses. (GAW 155-
56, VOP 104-05)  
 
Strictly speaking, no “objective” analysis is possible, i.e. an analysis that would organise 
knowledge of phenomena into a system of scientific laws. (GAW 180, VOP 128) Neither can 
there be an “objective” analysis independent of perspectives that select and organise 
phenomena. (GAW 170, VOP 119) Weber strongly rejects one of the dominant ideas about 
what objectivity is; that of transcendence of individual viewpoints, not having a perspective, 
objectivity as a ”view from nowhere”. This idea originated in 18th-century moral philosophy, 
and later spread throughout the sciences. (Daston 1992)  Weber’s objectivity makes a sharp 
break with this. We always see from a viewpoint (Gesichtspunkte). (GAW 170, VOP 119) 
Science cannot hope to achieve a unique and common perspective for all rational beings. 
There will always be a plurality of starting points from which to investigate reality. Human 
beings are cultural beings, with specific cultural perspectives and values. We see and analyse 
according to what we judge as relevant and important, i.e. what matters to us, what the 
problem in question is. It is the culture in which we live that gives us the understanding in 
which certain aspects of reality become interesting to us. This is what Weber calls the value-
relevance of science. Something becomes a scientific problem only in the light of a culturally 
shaped knowledge interest. (GAW 161, VOP 110)  
 
Value-relevance means that scientific problems and the viewpoints from which we analyse 
them depend on subjective factors; i.e. factors which are specific for a group sharing the same 
culture. ‘Objective’ would entail a universal perspective, same for everyone. Today, we see 
that the standard 20th century view of objectivity often conflates conduct, results and 
ontology, speaking of objectivity as at the same time freedom from perspective, 
intersubjective sameness, accurate representation and subject-independent existence. Weber 
rejected all these kinds of objectivity. Nevertheless, he saw scientific results as valid for all 
those who value the truth. (GAW 184, VOP 132) There is no unconditional “objective” 
validity, nor are there any “objective” values. To see scientific truths as valuable is a product 
of specific cultures. (GAW 213, VOP 160) Values are always cultural and part of a world 
view. The kind of objectivity that is attainable has to do with practicing value-free science.  
 
To return to the analytical diagram over versions of objectivity (see appendix), we can see 
that Weber’s scientific objectivity concerns the researcher’s behaviour, or cognitive practices. 
In Weber’s account, scientific objectivity is not primarily about knowledge. It is a mistake to 
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assume that knowledge itself could be objective, in the sense of independent of all values and 
free from all individual contingencies. (GAW 185, VOP 134)11 The only way that results are 
objective is in their culture-free and universal validity. (GAW 155, VOP 104) Apart from 
that, ‘objectivity’ as Weber’s uses it generally applies not to scientific results but to the 
researcher’s conduct. Furthermore, the goal of science cannot be to seek knowledge without 
preconditions. Knowledge cannot be ‘a “presuppositionless“ image or representation 
(Abbildung) of “objective” facts’. (GAW 192, VOP 141)12 We inevitably bring something 
into the knowledge-process and cannot merely reflect or represent a reality which precedes 
our conceptualisations. Our knowledge cannot be copies of the world and it is chimeric to 
assume that we can simply see things “as they are in themselves”. The knowledge we produce 
is always conceptualised through our cultural significances and there cannot be a unique 
scientific perspective. Weber says we can only turn our attention to fragments of the chaos 
that is reality. When we produce knowledge about reality, we categorise it in a culturally 
specific way, and bring order to chaos. (GAW 177-78, 207, VOP 126, 154-155) This can be 
done in several ways, and scientific results will not converge on one true account. However, 
even though knowledge may be sought from many viewpoints and is always an incomplete 
picture of the world, the results may be universally true and valid. For all those who value 
truth (and utilize reason), scientific results are necessarily valid. (GAW 184, VOP 132) In 
order to attain this validity and produce true knowledge, it is important that the scientist stays 
objective and also constructs analytical categories in a logical fashion. 
 





Culture and values gives us the problems to investigate and the concepts to start out with. Once the scientific 
investigation has started, values should be kept outside of the process. 
 
As cultural beings we always bring our culturally shaped perspectives with us. Out of the 
infinity that is reality we select those parts that are relevant to us given our culture and values. 
Or rather the other way round: We find ourselves in a situation where parts of reality have 
been made significant to us. We may alter these significations, consciously look for other 
parts of reality, or create new concepts. Culture may change, but for us as human beings there 
is nothing outside of it. A science entirely free from culture would be a contradiction in terms. 
Our concepts capture those fragments of reality which are significant to us. (GAW 175, VOP 
124) Our interest in reality – and in knowledge – is guided by values and concepts. This 
                                                 
11 Hence the scare quotes in the title of the Objectivity essay: ”Objektivität” 
12 ‘”voraussetzungslose” Abbildung ”objektiver” Tatsachen’ 
Problems, perspectives,    Scientific practice   Results      Application of  
selection and hypotheses           results 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Value-relevant        Value-free    Value-free      Guided by values 
means that there is a thin line separating science from faith. The categories with which we 
structure reality are subjective. Categories come with our language, which is a cultural 
product. (GAW 213, VOP 160) Culture may be understood as a specific perspective on the 
world; a relation to it; a certain way of interacting and making sense of it. Culture is the form 
through which we live in the world. It directs our interest to the world in historically specific 
ways. A transcendental presupposition of the cultural sciences is ’that we are cultural beings, 
endowed with the capability and the will to consciously take a stance towards the world and 
to invest it with meaning.’ (GAW 180, VOP 129, my translation) 
 
It is through cultural significance that the infinite chaos of reality is organised and given 
meaning. Weber says that any event in reality is caused by an infinite number of causal 
processes. (GAW 184, VOP 132) Fritz Ringer puts Weber’s view thus: ‘The world of the 
cultural and social sciences is an infinitely complex network of causal relations among 
particulars.’ (Ringer 1997:4). That is why there can be no definite set of “scientific laws” 
from which reality can be deduced. (GAW 172, VOP 120) A scientific perspective allows us 
to select some factors that seem relevant to us, given our values and interests, out of the 
infinite manifold that is reality. What allows us to bring order to the chaos that is reality, is 
the fact that in every single case, only a small part of reality has meaning and is of interest for 
us. (GAW 177-78, VOP 125-26) Therefore, not even the tiniest section of reality could be 
exhaustively described, since for any event both the number of causes and the types of causes 
are infinite. (ibid.) A specific scientific study cannot expect to be “exhaustive”. As an 
example, just because The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism had focused on more 
“idealistic” factors of explanation, that did not preclude the validity of explanations of the 
same process using economic or material factors. Rather, different scientific perspectives 
should be seen as complementary. They all highlight aspects of reality which are significant 
in their peculiarity. They tell us meaningful true things about the world, but there is no way to 
tell it all. Weber says that scientific explanations are necessarily “one-sided” and no single 
perspective can lay claim to the whole truth. (GAW 170, VOP 119) Knowledge originates 
from a viewpoint. (GAW 181, VOP 129) 
 
Weber sketches a kind of scientific pluralism, where different viewpoints give different 
partial answers. Yet, for anyone who understands the questions and wants to seek the truth, 
scientific results are necessarily valid. Rationality is the same for all human beings regardless 
of culture, even though not all use it as much, and that is what allows for universal validity. 
(GAW 155, VOP 104) Scientific knowledge may achieve ‘objective’ validity in the meaning 
of universal validity. That validity rests upon the presupposition ‘of the value of that truth 
which empirical knowledge alone is able to give us.’ (MSS 110, GAW 213) It is possible not 
to value truth at all. Other cultures may value other things, but what is distinct about the West 




In order to explain the complex causal processes in society, human subjects need to be 
actively interpreted. Weber’s methods require that the scientist empathises with the 
individuals under study enough to correctly account for their motives and ideas. To 
accomplish this feat of understanding (Verstehen) the scientist does not only have to 
interpret, s/he must also actively pass (rational) judgements about what is true. The researcher 
cannot just neutrally and passively register what is going on. Weber’s science is very far from 
the type of empiricist ideal which desires non-theoretical and judgement-free observations. 
Not only does Weber see theoretical presuppositions as unavoidable, he also sees 
observations as ordered according to our concepts from the very beginning. Unlike the earlier 
empiricist version of objectivity, the scientist has to use her own judgement (Urteilskraft) and 
actively intervene into the process. Therefore, the social scientist cannot remain passive and 
detached. Weber entirely rejects the empiricist view of the self. There are some clear Kantian 
traits in the self: The scientist selects phenomena and shapes them through cognitive and 
conceptual categories. Weber deviates from Kant in an important aspect: He sees the 
(linguistic) categories that organise phenomena and structure our experience of the world, as 
culturally variable and in this sense subjective. We structure our perception of reality through 
our cultural value-orientation. (GAW 177-78, 180, 213, VOP 126, 128, 160) There can be no 
neutral or passive perception of sense experience. This is why the social scientist must put 
something of herself into the process, using imagination, interpretation and judgement.  
 
However, only the rational and theoretical aspect of the self is allowed into the scientific 
process. The evaluative13 and passionate aspect needs to be restrained and controlled. 
Judgements made by the rational aspect are necessary, while those by the evaluative aspect 
are prohibited. Furthermore, culture can only partially be quantified. Even if statistical 
methods may be of use, culture possesses essentially distinguishing properties, making them 
unfit to be studied only with methods from the natural sciences. Cultural reality is dynamic 
and forever changing. Society is historical. As culture changes, our interests and the ensuing 
scientific problems will change. There are in principle an infinite number of truths to tell 
about the world, so we should not believe that science can be completed, or turned into a 
system which explains the world. Furthermore, as culture changes, it not only changes our 
problems but also the very reality which we seek knowledge of. Unlike knowledge of nature, 
knowledge of culture is more bound to a specific era and location in its applicability. Results 
may not be generalised too widely, neither in time nor space. Therefore, as culture changes, 
our concepts, problems, and explanations have to change with it. (GAW 213-14, VOP 160-1) 
 
                                                 
13 The term normally translated as ‘evaluative’ in Weber’s texts is the German ‘wertende’ (Swedish: 
‘värderande’). 
Social sciences must be empirical sciences of concrete reality (Wirklichkeitwissenschaften). 
(GAW 170, VOP 119) They study the particular things that actually exist; historically 
specific phenomena (cultures, societies, events, religions, institutions, economic systems). 
The aim is to understand the real causal processes that occur in the world and provide a 
‘causal explanation of an individual fact’. (GAW 177, VOP 126) In Ola Agevall’s words, 
sociology is a ‘science of unique events’. It answers questions of how unique social 
phenomena became the way they are. (Agevall 1999) To trace the causal histories that made 
things the way they are, we need to combine interpretative hermeneutic methods (Verstehen) 
with others. Weber distinguishes sciences of concrete reality from sciences of “laws”. The 
latter aim at constructing a system of scientific laws from which it would be possible to 
“deduce” reality in a deterministic fashion. Legitimate examples of these are found in the 
natural sciences, whereas in other areas they are problematic. Such systems of laws may be 
coherent but sometimes have very little to do with reality, economics being the prime 
example. Economists aim to find general laws governing human behaviour. This is an 
improper aim for any science studying human affairs and stems from a misunderstanding 
about the nature of their study object. (GAW 170-72, VOP 119-122)  
 
Imagination was banned from the objective natural sciences since it was seen as adding 
something to the picture. From an empiricist point of view this was a deadly sin, since it 
brought part of the subject into the object: The use of imagination is an intervention from the 
subject of the scientist, making the observation subjective and invalid. Weber on the other 
hand, subscribes to a more Kantian view of the self where imagination (Vorstellung) is 
necessarily a part of shaping our observations. We need an imagination (Phantasie) that is 
trained and oriented towards reality, able to judge whether our concepts are adequate. (GAW 
194, VOP 142) Observations cannot mirror reality as the empiricist would hope. Our concepts 
are constructed on the basis of our culture and values and so cannot correspond to an 
independently existing reality. To believe so is to misunderstand the basic human condition. 
Weber can thus be said to take Kant’s metaphysics and transform it into a culturally sensitive 
form. Different cultures will perceive reality differently. That is the essence of what Weber 
call value-relevance; we select and conceptualise parts of reality because of the way that our 
world view and values are. (GAW 161, 175-78, VOP 110, 124-126 ) We also need 
imagination and inspiration to come up with new hypotheses and ideas, and to formulate new 
questions. (GAW 589-90, MSS 16-17) In this respect, personal qualities make a difference in 
science also when it comes to the backgrounds of scientists. As an example, those having 
political convictions different from the majority of scientists may be better equipped to spot 
assumptions that are taken for granted and seen as self-evident. They may also come up with 
new hypotheses and perceive unorthodox problems, thus furthering the advancement of 
science. (GAW 496, MSS 7)  
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3.2 Objectivity as value-freedom 
To be disinterested means not letting personal interests affect judgement. The notion of 
disinterestedness has its origin in 17th century moral philosophy and law. In the 18th century it 
becomes imported into science and is advocated as an important virtue. From the mid 19th 
century it is absorbed into discourses of objectivity and from then on seldom advocated on its 
own. (Dear 1992) The German language has no clear equivalent to the term. It is nevertheless 
clear that Weber advocates disinterestedness. In several places he argues that the scientist 
must not let personal interests and personal values affect scientific judgement. This does not 
capture the whole meaning of objectivity as value-freedom. 
 
Weber’s form of objectivity contrasts in many ways both with the two types that were 
predominant during the 19th century. Daston & Galison coins the first aperspectival 
objectivity. It aims to eliminate the individual point of view (which Weber does not) but also 
for disinterestedness. The second, mechanical objectivity, aims to eliminate human 
intervention by suppressing all active aspects of the self except calculation and observation. 
Weber explicitly rejects such a view. The similarities that these types nevertheless have in 
common with Weber is the stress on disinterestedness and value-freedom on the one hand, 
and strict self-control and will to willessness on the other. Writing from a later point in time, 
Weber has a different understanding of the human self. The earlier naturalistic versions 
wanted to gain a culture-free viewpoint or make scientific work mechanic and free from 
imagination, interpretation, and (rational) judgement. This does not square with Weber’s 
culturally informed view of the human subject. In many ways, his version of objectivity has 
close affinities with the scientific virtue which historically develops later than objectivity: 
trained judgement. According to the virtue of trained judgement, an entirely objective process 
was not the main goal of scientific inquiry. Just to produce objective accounts free from often 
made the results less relevant and interesting. Instead, the researcher needed to form qualified 
judgements that came closer to the truth. Skill was necessary to correctly interpret the 
phenomena. The interpreter always brings something with her into the process. (Daston & 
Galison 2007: ch. 3) This comes very close to what Weber is saying, and his ideal of good 
science can be seen as a blend of objectivity and trained judgement. Chronologically, he is 
right in between the two. His ideals are in some ways part of a larger shift within the sciences 
in general, but the views on value-freedom and his separation of science from politics are 
new.  
 
Similar views on value-freedom were expressed at the time by Weber’s friends and 
colleagues Ferdinand Tönnies and Werner Sombart, although Weber’s account was the most 
widespread and he was the one who most fiercely debated the issue publicly. (Proctor 1991) 
Objectivity as value-freedom must not be confused with complete neutrality. As a person it is 
impossible to be value-free. In matters of value one can never avoid having a personal 
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standpoint. When assuming the role of the scientist, these must be kept in the background 
through strict self-control, in order to keep thinking, description and practice as value-free as 
possible. Scientific objectivity shall not be confused with lack of personal views or 
conviction. The scientist too should follow personal ideals in his life, but be very clear about 
not mixing them up with science. He should not be a person without values but a person who 
does not portray his values as scientific. (GAW 157, VOP 106) Furthermore, every action 
entails taking a stand for certain values and against others. (GAW 150, VOP 99) What one 
can avoid is portraying one’s values as having scientific support, or as being “the standpoint 
of science”. No world view (Weltanschauung) can be deduced from science, since a world 
view always contains evaluations/opinions (Wertungen). (GAW 154, VOP 103) Evaluations 
(value-judgements) are always political since they take a standpoint on what ends are worth 
pursuing. There is a logical gap between facts and values. Within the sphere of science, the 
researcher stays neutral, at least in practice. The scientist as scientist stays silent on normative 
matters and does not let them affect the work. In the political sphere on the other hand, it is 
one’s duty to express personal values and to engage in debate over them. (GAW 601, VOP 
27) It was only in matters of pure facts – how to draw empirical and logical conclusions from 
empirical data – that it was possible to hold a “purely” rational position. However, in any 
question of culture or politics – of what was valuable, relevant, important or desirable – one 
could never be neutral. Therefore the scientist must abstain from saying anything with regard 
to these matters, unless he explicitly stated that he was now giving an un-scientific value 
judgement. Scientists only pass rational/theoretical judgements about facts, not practical 
judgements about values and actions. These are not to be confused. Neither values nor 
emotions should affect scientific judgements. 
 
A few similarities may be found between Weber’s view of science and the positivist 
philosophy of science that was later to develop in Vienna and Britain. Logical distinctions and 
clarity are of utmost importance. Mixing logically distinct categories and creating confusion 
are major sins. It is extremely important to demarcate science from non-science, and to 
maintain the autonomy of science vis-à-vis other parts of society. Even though Weber’s 
position has often been labelled ‘positivist’ due to its stress on objectivity, this is clearly 
misleading and has more to do with Talcott Parsons’ usage of Weber than the actual texts 
themselves. (Eliaeson 2002) Weber does not share the empiricist assumptions about the 
atomistic nature of sense impressions or the possibility of theory-free perception.14 
 
Apart from the above mentioned, the kernel of (half)truth in the positivist accusation is that 
Weber explicitly upholds the Humean distinction between facts and values. He sees them as 
clearly distinct logical categories that should not be confused. Values are to be kept outside of 
scientific practice. Scientists may empirically investigate what values people hold, and in 
                                                 
14 On positivism, see Hacking 1983: ch. 3 
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what logical relations different standpoints, judgements and value-axioms stand to each other. 
That is all. There can be science about values but not a science of values. Values are always 
subjective and depend upon individual existential choices. Science cannot prove the validity 
of values, but may nevertheless investigate values empirically and logically. There are four 
ways that science may clarify issues of values: 
a) Reconstruct the value-axioms behind concrete evaluative statements. 
b) Deduct implications from value-axioms. What follows logically from them? 
c) Determine the factual consequences of putting value standpoints into action. 
d) Uncover new value-axioms. (GAW 510-11, MSS 20-21) 
 
Weber said in debate that ‘mixing a statement of what should be, into scientific questions is a 
thing of the devil.’ (GASS 419)15 According to Hans Henrik Bruun, Weber only has one 
theoretical argument for the principle of value-freedom: that the spheres of science and values 
are logically different, of completely distinct sorts altogether. (Bruun 2007: 63) Ringer states 
that ‘the logical distinction between descriptive and prescriptive propositions, is and ought’ 
was ‘[t]he conceptual core of Weber’s case for value neutrality’ (Ringer 2004: 111) Weber 
sees facts and values as logically ‘heterogeneous’ and belonging to separate categories. 
(GAW 509, MSS 20) This logical fact makes Weber advocate a certain conduct for scientists: 
They should not mix up the two. Weber’s task was one of clarification, of making clear to 
people which ultimate values that were logically entailed by their positions and statements. 
Scientific analyses of values were meant to facilitate the making of value-choices. (GAW 
507-8, MSS 18) David Owen has shown that Weber’s own analyses could be understood as 
such attempts at expanding our self-understanding and autonomy. (Owen 1994)  
 
Weber allows value-judgements and value-laden concepts in a scientific work only if they are 
clearly declared as such, so that no confusion arises. One should not use a value-laden term 
and pass it off as a scientific judgement or as a neutral concept. Doing so would be to ignore 
and deny the inevitable struggle over values. That would falsely portray value-laden terms as 
merely descriptive, instead of acknowledging their association with a specific standpoint and 
a certain world view. As an illustration, during a meeting of the Verein für Sozialpolitik in 
1910, Weber is reprimanded by some of his few like-minded colleagues for using the term 
‘magnificent’ (grossartig). He admits that this word contains a value-judgement (Wertung), 
takes it back and switches instead to the value-free term ‘interesting’. (GASS 454) So here we 
have an example of a term that was considered value-free. Weber holds that scientific 
concepts stem from our values and interests, yet argue that we must not pass value-laden 
terms off as scientific concepts. However, it seems to follow from the tenet of value-relevance 
that all concepts are value-laden. Weber seems uneasy to draw this conclusion. Jay Ciaffa 
                                                 
15 ’das Hineinmengen eines Seinsollens in wissenschaftliche Fragen ist eine Sache des Teufels.’ (GASS 419, my 
translation) 
argues that after the later criticism from Habermas and others we can see today that Weber 
was mistaken on this point. He should have conceded that all concepts are value-laden. This 
does not invalidate the call to avoid excessive value-judgements. (Ciaffa 1998)  
 
An interesting clue to this problem may be found in the prime examples Weber gives of 
value-laden concepts: ‘productivity’ and ‘national wealth’ (Volkswohlstand). (GAW 118, 
GASS 418-25) Willhelm Hennis points out that Weber stresses that these value-laden terms 
hide value-conflicts. An unqualified usage of the term ‘productivity’ assumes only the interest 
of the entrepreneurs as a general interest. It hides the fact that the economy contains 
conflicting interests and that what is productive for some may damage the interests of others. 
These terms portray as unequivocal something which actually stands for certain goals at the 
expense of others. (Hennis 1994)  
 
What is problematic about those concepts that Weber so fiercely criticises, is not only that 
they present as “merely scientific” something which is in fact the result of a value-judgement, 
but also that they hide this fact about themselves. It seems as if value-laden concepts have two 
aspects: They are evaluative and they conceal conflicts of values and interests. To expose 
conflicting interests and values present in the concepts seems to be a slightly different point 
than demanding that only descriptive terms are used in science. In 1910 it was possible to 
state that ‘magnificent’ is a value-laden term, whereas ‘interesting’ is value-free. Today, after 
a whole century preoccupied with studying language, this distinction no longer seems tenable. 
Many now argue that every description is also evaluative and that the very idea of a neutral 
description-language free from valuations has lost credibility. (Kincaid, Dupré & Wylie 2007) 
There exist a growing number of case studies that show how various scientific descriptions 
are value-laden and connected to world-views and values. (see e.g. Martin 1991, Dupré 2007, 
Longino 1990, Haraway 1990)  
 
According to these researchers, the fact that scientific theories can be shown to carry implicit 
value-content, does not in itself invalidate these theories. However, the value-content of 
science may have important consequences for matters of policy and practical action based on 
these theories. Many theories or methodologies also serve to legitimise or normalise existing 
relations of power, performing what Karl Mannheim called an ‘extra-theoretical function’. 
(Hacking 1999: ch. 2) This may or may not be problematic. In any case, since so many 
decisions today are guided by scientific knowledge, it is highly relevant in to see which value-
assumptions that are already present in concepts and descriptions.  
 
Hilary Putnam shows how the distinction between fact and value should not be understood as 
a dichotomy (mutually exclusive categories), but how every factual description is more or less 
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evaluative. Language cannot be neatly sorted into factual propositions and value judgements 
respectively. This has important consequences for our understanding of Weber:  
 
But what Max Weber failed to acknowledge was that while indeed the answers to a scientific 
question must never be dictated by one’s value system, the terms one uses even in description in 
history and in sociology and the other social sciences are invariably ethically colored; this is 
nowhere more true than in the case of the terms Weber used to describe his ideal “types”. 
(Putnam 2002: 63) 
 
Even though Putnam misses the specificity of Weber’s account and almost reduces his value-
freedom to its component part ‘disinterestedness’, we may draw from his insights about 
language. Every word carries value-connotations. Think e.g. of the varying political 
implications of describing human beings as ‘persons’, ‘individuals’, ‘consumers’ or ‘citizens’. 
Value-ladenness applies also to the very terms ‘objective’ and ‘value-free’ themselves. To 
many practitioners of science, they have very positive connotations. To say that of a scientific 
result ‘That is not objective!’ is highly evaluative and charged.  
 
If we accept the view of language that Putnam, Ciaffa, Dupré and many others today hold, it 
appears as if two of the aspects of value-freedom here stand in opposition. Value-freedom in 
the form that Weber gave it holds an intrinsic tension. By claiming that only some terms are 
value-laden, it actually hides the values present in other “scientific” or “merely descriptive” 
terms. From a contemporary point of view, it thus seems as if the ban on value-laden terms is 
counterproductive, since it allows some terms and not others, while at the same time hiding 
the fact that these are also value-laden. This has the paradoxical effect that Weber’s version of 
value-freedom contributes to doing precisely what it was meant to prevent. Nevertheless, even 
if we grant that language cannot avoid being evaluative to a degree, the second point still 
stands. It is possible to admit that all terms are value-laden while still claiming that it is 
illegitimate to hide conflicts between values. Such a position could e.g. argue for the open 
acknowledgement of the values present in the terms used, trying to raise awareness that 
language is not only theory-laden but also value-laden. Stephen Toulmin develops a similar 
argument when he claims that a tenable version of objectivity ‘requires us to make explicit, 
and to make allowances for, the interests and values that we ourselves bring to our research.’ 
(Toulmin 2001: 96) However, to further develop a version of value-freedom that avoids the 
above quandaries is a task beyond the scope of this thesis. 
3.3 Chapter summary 
Like many other versions of objectivity, Weber’s account mostly concerns the conduct of 
researchers. Objectivity-as-value-freedom is designed both to keep science free from politics 
and politics free from science. It functions as a double prohibition. If politics enter scientific 
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practice, science cannot clarify properly. If science enters political practice, it replaces free 
value-choices with false technical certainty. According to Weber, legitimate science may only 
give statements of logical and empirical facts. In questions of values, there are no facts. 
Science must therefore stay silent on these matters and cannot arbitrate or choose side in the 
eternal existential battle between ultimate values. Science does not guide us to a world view; 
it merely clarifies to the combatants what the stakes are.  
 
Weber said that the value of truth motivates science, and that other cultural values give 
direction to the investigations. Science is value-relevant and cultural values take part in 
shaping scientific problems, perspectives and concepts. They direct our perception towards 
certain fragments of reality and not others. Contemporary science studies show how scientific 
practice is guided by scientific values. As for results, to the extent that they are described in 
language, they are more or less value-laden if we are to believe several scholars within 
science studies and philosophy. From a contemporary perspective, the diagram from the 
beginning of the chapter would be modified in the following way. It still remains an issue of 
debate whether cultural values play any part in scientific practice. 
 
Values in the scientific process: Contemporary version 
 Problems, perspectives, Scientific practice  Results        Application of  
 concepts and selection                results 
________________________Guided by________________________________________  
Value-relevant       scientific values  Value-laden           Guided by values  
 
 
Weber stands for a different version of objectivity than many before and after him. Scientific 
objectivity does not simply mean ‘finding the truth’, although that is what we ultimately aim 
at. Objectivity means practicing science in a value-free way manner and producing value-free 
scientific accounts, in order for science and politics to stay separate. To be objective is not to 
mix up facts with values or science with politics. It has very little to do with some of the chief 
concerns within the natural science versions of objectivity: transcending the individual 
perspective and preventing all intervention from the subject. Weber allows for many things 
which others prohibit: theoretical presuppositions, individual perspective, individual skill, 
imagination, interpretation, and theory-laden observations. His scientific objectivity is first 
and foremost about value-freedom. This applies to the investigation and the end product 
(knowledge) but not to questions, concepts, selection and problems. In all these, culture and 
values are present. In service of the calling of science, scientists must respect the logical gap 
between facts and values in order not to do politics. When we compare objectivity as value-
freedom to the analytical model [see the box ‘Conduct’ in appendix], we see that only three 
sub-values are kept: Disinterestedness (ban on personal interests), freedom from emotions and 
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value-freedom. The third is subdivided into further prohibitions. It is forbidden to A) Pass 
value-judgements and portray them as facts. B) Use value-laden terms (which contain 
judgements). C) Conceal conflicts of interests and values. D) Deduce practical conclusions 
from facts. 
 
 No practical 
conclusions from facts 












Not hide conflicts of 
interests and values 
No emotions 
The following two chapters will show how plurality and diversity within science is connected 
also to plurality within self and society. In all three spheres irreconcilable perspectives co-
exist, although not peacefully but in constant tension and struggle. Weber’s view of science 
requires also specific views of ethics, the self and politics, in order to be a tenable option. 
 
 
4. Self: The objective scientist and his suppressed 
side 
 
How did Weber conceive of the researcher? What type of human subject is presupposed by 
his scientific objectivity? While bearing in mind that background assumptions about the self 
change over time, we look at both mental structure and personal traits. What is the mental 
order of the scientist’s self? 
 
A first point – and one that is rather easy to make – is that Weber’s ideal scientist is a man. 
Weber consistently writes ‘he’. In this he was precisely in tune with his time. Still in the 
1950s, the leading sociologist of science Robert Merton did not consider the possibility that 
the scientist could be anything but a man. (Kjørup 1999: 113.) When trying to see the 
specificity of Weber’s account, this point is therefore less significant, since male bias was 
generally the case. However, in chapter 5 when ethics, autonomy and the responsibility for 
the nation are discussed, gender will show itself to have some bearing on these matters. 
 
The most striking similarity between Weber’s objectivity and earlier ideals is that they all 
stress discipline, self-control and turning the self on itself. Some aspects of the subject 
interfere with rational science and therefore there is a need for proper conduct. The scientist 
must keep close check on his/her mental life, with some mental faculties negating and 
restraining others. Weber’s objective scientist is less mechanical than was often the case in 
the natural sciences. In the 19th century there was a strong wish to make the researcher more 
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machine-like, or even having the scientist replaced altogether by self-registering instruments 
and calculating devices. (Daston & Galison 2007) Another way to eliminate subjectivity from 
the scientific process was to turn everything into standardised numbers, since numbers were 
seen to lack subjective qualities. (Porter 1994) Weber explicitly rejects these kinds of 
epistemological moves and the fears that motivate them. Science is not a matter of cold 
calculation. The factory, which was sometimes an explicit ideal for natural scientists, is 
dismissed as a model for science. There must be whole persons present for scientific work to 
be possible. Just like in art, inspiration and imagination are essential. (GAW 589-91, VOP 15-
17) Daston & Galison tell us that objective science originally contrasted primarily against art. 
The virtues of the artist depended on being as subjective as possible, whereas the scientist 
should constrain subjectivity. Their traits of these two types were complementary and should 
not be confused. (Daston & Galison 2007: 246) To Weber’s ideal science, several of the 
artist’s defining traits were no longer threatening but necessary. A further contrast is that 
Weber stresses the need for interpretation and skill, things which were directly banned in the 
natural science ideals of objectivity. The scientist cannot be a calculating machine or a 
mechanical registration device, but must have empathy, imagination, judgement and 
creativity. These particular subjective aspects do not pose threats to Weber’s ideal science. 
The subjectivity that he wants to ward off is the evaluative side of the self. The fear 
motivating Weber’s epistemology is that of mixing facts with values, or science with politics. 
So what type of self can avoid these dangers? To answer this we must first understand how 
Weber generally conceived of the human subject. 
4.1 The unity of the divided self 
Weber tells us that there are three types of arguments. The first is questions of cultural values. 
They are directed towards our emotions (Gefühle) and our ability to feel enthusiasm 
(Begeisterung) for something. The second is questions of the validity of ethical norms, 
directed at our conscience. The third type is questions of the validity of empirical truth, which 
are directed towards our ability and need to order empirical reality through our thinking. 
(GAW 155, VOP 104)16 It appears thus that we have three distinct areas, a triad similar but 
not identical to the three types of argumentation that Jürgen Habermas discusses. (Carleheden 
1996) However, for Weber only two of these areas have validation criteria. Science and ethics 
can reach valid results, which for Weber mean universal validity. It is possible to reach 
conclusions about truth and ethical norms that are valid for all humans. Cultural values on the 
other hand are subjective and simply have to be chosen. Even though we make judgments in 
all areas, value-judgements cannot be valid. What Weber also tells us here is that different 
parts of the self deal with these three areas: Our emotions, our conscience and our rational 
thinking respectively. The mental faculty of judgement appears to be split in three parts. 
Rational judgements are performed by the intellect, value judgements are guided by the 
                                                 
16 Weber also uses the term ’Verstand’ to refer to this cognitive ordering, just like Kant. (GAW 157, VOP 106) 
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emotions and ethical judgements are performed by the conscience. Science and politics are 
associated with their respective institutions, university and state, whereas ethics seem to 
belong only on a personal level. 
 
 Politics  Ethics Science 
 
Mental faculty: Emotions Conscience Intellect 
 
Questions of: Cultural values Ethical norms  Empirical truth 
 





Weber says it is the scientist’s duty always to make clear in a scientific text whether the 
arguments are directed to reason (and thus fall within science) or to the emotions (and thus 
fall within non-scientific value-judgements, i.e. politics). He primarily contrasts the thinking 
researcher against the wilful human. The scientist must always make clear in which role he 
speaks, so that scientific statements are not taken for value-judgements and vice versa. (GAW 
157, VOP 106) The greatest sin a scientist can commit is to confound scientific (logical or 
empirical) concepts with evaluative concepts. To present one category as being the other 
violates the logical distinction between facts and values, and also the separation between the 
two distinct value-spheres of science and politics. It is the ’elementary duty of scientific self-
control’ to sharply distinguish between logical and evaluative categories. (GAW 200, VOP 
148)17 It is interesting to note that the language Weber uses here is highly morally loaded. It 
is not rationality that calls for this distinction, but duty and self-control. Self-restraint an
discipline is of utmost importance to Weber’s objectivity. To be objective is not to let the 
evaluating side of oneself take over. There is an inner conflict between reason and passion 
where self-control is required in order to maintain objectivity. 
d 
                                                
 
The division between the different aspects of the self must not go too far, since all are needed 
in a flourishing human being. If value-free rationality were to suppress emotions and non-
formal reasoning too much, the result would be a soulless specialist with no feeling for what 
is important in human life. A value-free scientist should not be a person who values nothing, 
but a person who does not let evaluations into science. (GAW 157, VOP 106) There is an 
inherent danger in the process of rationalisation and specialisation. The person who in his 
entire personality is nothing but a specialist, is not a whole human being. If a culture would 
deteriorate to forgetting value-questions, such a society would indeed shape poor persons, 
 
17 ’elementare Pflicht der Wissenschaftlichen Selbstkontrolle’ (GAW 200, VOP 148, my translation) 
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able only to see and discuss matters of technical and instrumental character. (PE 86)18 It is 
precisely since values are so important that the principle of value-freedom must be upheld, in 
order not to illegitimately confuse them with other types of questions. If the scientist does not 
adhere to the principle, s/he risks reducing values to technical matters. 
 
According to Weber’s view of ethics, everyone must use their conscience to choose an 
ultimate value and follow it wholeheartedly. (Owen 1994) The choice of value-axiom is pre-
rational, existential and subjective. Rationality cannot guide us, or prove what should be 
chosen, it can only help us by clarifying what is involved in the choice.  Once a value-sphere 
has been chosen, one must accept the calling of this particular sphere. Every vocation has its 
own inherent laws. (GAW 494, MSS 5) Science too is a value-sphere. (Bruun 2007: 28) The 
scientist has made the value-choice of serving the truth. Along with the acceptance of the 
scientific calling, or vocation, comes a code of adhering to the truth and of keeping science 
and politics apart. The scientific calling means that one stays loyal to the cause (Sache) and 
does not propagate one’s own interests or values. 
 
The objective scientist strives hard to find out more about the study object, but not for the 
sake of curiosity. According to Daston, curiosity had gone from being a vice in medieval 
times to eventually becoming a virtue. In the 17th century, it was considered good to find out 
about ever more phenomena and novel objects. Curiosity was controlled but fun – almost 
indulgence – whereas it was later became more disciplined and part of self-controlled hard 
work, where attention was willfully and tirelessly turned towards the object of study. (Daston 
1995: 17, 2007: ch. 4) The latter applies also to Weber’s account. For him curiosity is 
subordinate to duty. One should inquire and find new knowledge as part of the calling to the 
cause of science. The scientist does not look for the new for the sake of enjoyment and 
curiosity, but in order to serve the cause which he follows. 
4.2 Science as a passion for reason 
Weber contrasts the scientist with the politician. For both, it is important to have 
Leidenschaft, i.e. fervour or passion. Both should be passionately devoted to the chosen cause 
(Sache). In the case of the politician this means fighting for a certain cause, and for the 
scientist it means untiringly seeking knowledge about a specialised area. Leidenschaft is not 
about giving in to passions, rather almost the contrary. It is to be passionate about not letting 
the passions in, being dedicated to the project and not succumbing to personal interests and 
values. The politician must combine Leidenschaft with a feeling of responsibility and a sense 
of proportions. (GPS 435, VOP 80)  Passion in this context does not mean giving in to 
                                                 
18 Much has been written on the dangers of letting instrumental rationality drive out value-rational considerations 
altogether, but that lies outside the aim of the present work. See e.g. discussions by Jürgen Habermas, Max 
Horkheimer and many others. 
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emotions, but following the chosen value-sphere with Sachlichkeit, only having the cause in 
mind.19 ‘Passion in the meaning of dispassion/dedication (Sachlichkeit): passionate 





l of the emotions. 





 agree to stand aside, to eliminate subjective 





                                                
 
Weber also mentions Leidenschaft as a prerequisite for inspiration. The scientist needs st
Leidenschaft, hard work and self-control not to be affected by personal goals in his toil. 
(GAW 589, VOP 15-16) After having chosen science as a calling, the scientist does no
sides in the struggle between other values even if he should wish to, but practice
restriction. Those who adhere to the scientific calling will carry out their duties 




Weber states that the calling of science means that the struggle for knowledge is all; it is a 
self-absorbing enterprise where no space is left for the expression of personality or personal 
wishes.  Science is practiced for its own sake – for the love of truth – and not as a means to 
something else. (GAW 599, VOP 25) Weber repeatedly stresses that to accept the calling is t
become a servant to the cause. The scientist practices self-abnegation and should even ho
that his own contribution be surpassed and made obsolete, so that the cause of science is 
furthered. (GAW 592, VOP 592) The person should remain humble and keep her personal
in the background. To accept the calling is to
s
 
Both the scientist and the politician should devote all their time and energy not to their own 
advancement, but to serving the cause they have chosen. The calling/vocation (Beruf) requires 
not only dedication to the cause but also the art of self-limitation (Selbstbegrenzung), drawing
borders for oneself. (GAW 494, MSS 6) The cause should be everything and the person on
its humble servant, passionately striving for it.  However, the ways of serving differ. The 
politician serves the cause by struggling to advance it. Politics is the struggle between those 
ultimate values, or ‘gods’ as Weber metaphorically calls them. It is everybody’s duty to fig
for the values they believe in. (GAW 601, VOP 27) The politician shows devotion for the 
cause she believes in by attempting to further it at the expense of other goals. Weber stresses
in several places that there is no rational way of reconciling these disparate goals since they 
 
19 ‘Sachlichkeit’ is hard to translate into English in this context. An English-German dictionary (dict.leo.org) 
gives the main suggestions ‘dispassion’ or ‘objectivity’, which is both correct and may seem misleading. ‘Sache’ 
means ‘thing’ or ‘cause’. For Weber, Sache denotes the goal or faith that one follows, and Sachlichkeit a 
dedication to this cause. 
20 ‘Leidenschaft im Sinn von Sachlichkeit : leidenschaftliche Hingabe an eine “Sache”, an den Gott oder Dämon, 
der ihr Gebieter ist.’ 
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are different world-views, value-orientations towards the world (Weltanschauungen). (GAW 
153, VOP 102) Ultimate value-standpoints are at bottom irreconcilable. They have to meet in 
battle. (GAW 507, 608, MSS 17, VOP 35) In questions of values, we will always have a 







e scientist’s duty to create clarity and incite responsibility in 







 nature, but by willpower and moral strife. Heinrich 
ickert said after Weber’s death:  
s
 
In Weber’s eyes, the scientist serves her chosen cause by ceaselessly trying to understand and
seek knowledge about it. Everyone who wishes to be a scientist must value the goal of tru
but apart from that one chooses the area of study out of one’s interests and values. These 
values are often given by culture, but we as individuals may choose between them. After she 
has chosen, the scientist pursues the cause and tries to investigate it to the best of her efforts
She should be truly passionate about it, although this does not mean letting those emotions 
affect the scientific work. Value-judgments stem from emotions, and they are to be restrained 
within the sphere of science. Passion is used only as motivation for dedication; working hard
and ceaselessly serving the cause. The scientist is a person who has a passion for empirical 
truth generally and for the chosen area of study specifically. Science only clarifies the logic, 
consistency and consequences of value choices. It helps making clear which standpoints are
consistent with certain values, and what would be the probable consequences of following
them. Science says nothing of whether these values and goals are good or bad. Scientists 
serve their chosen specific cause (the truth about a certain area of study) by clarifying and 
understanding it better. It is th
o
 
Leidenschaft and Sachlichkeit are normally considered as opposites, but in Weber’s account 
they are both necessary for objectivity. Since emotions provide the motivation for pract
science and rational thinking, this gives the seemingly paradoxical situation where the 
emotions motivate reason to control and delineate the emotions. Without emotions and 
values, science would not be possible, but for science to remain possible, values and emotions
must not be present in science. Through this elegant solution, Weber stresses the importance 
of values and emotions for being a successful scientist and a whole human being. Emoti
cannot be eradicated, yet they must remain outside of science. In this struggle between 
intellect and emotions, the conscience remains neutral. If responsibility is not assumed, the
different mental faculties will mix with each other and transgress their proper boundaries. 
Human nature contains conscience, intellect and emotions, but we must civilise and restrain 
ourselves in order to produce science and achieve autonomy. Reason must subdue and control 
the emotions, drawing the boundaries which the latter must respect. Alvin Gouldner desc
Weber as a minotaur; a cloven nature split between head and heart; reason and emotion. 
(Gouldner 1964) Although this may appear to be correct at first glance, it is not the who
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…[for Weber] there was nothing for it but to distinguish sharply between the theoretical man
and the practical man … not only conceptually, but in the reality of his own person ... Such 
dualism was both a moral and a theoretical necessity for him, and he carried it out in practice to
an astonishingly high degree … [The audience felt] that they were listening to a man who was 
 
Rickert touches upon several themes which have shown themselves interesting in our 
analysis: the distinction between two types of behavior; that this distinction was both moral 
and theoretical; that the theoretical aspect of the self needs to suppress the practical aspect. 
Within the person, an active part of the self strives hard to keep another part inactive. The will 
is used to control itself. The scientist must will that the mental faculty of the will be restra
by the intellect. The wilful, wishing, feeling human must wish to restrict itself so that the 
intellect may perform its task undisturbed. (see p. 30 above) When describing the s
objectivity in 19th century natural sciences, Daston & Galison talk about a ‘will to 
willessness’. This means to “practice self-discipline, self-restraint, self-abnegation, self-
annihilation and a multitude of other techniques of self-imposed selflessness.” (Daston & 
Galison 2007:203) Paradoxically enough, the self wishes not to have any wishes, at least n
on the inside of science. The main obstacle to proper knowledge is the intervention of the 
wrongful aspects of the self. This structure found in the natural sciences fits very well also 
with Weber’s form of objectivity, despite the differences in which elements of the se
on the outside. Weber’s Leidenschaft, and thereby his objectivity, requires a strong 
engagement of the self to avoid any illegitimate engagement. The self keeps (the prohibited 
aspects of) itself in check. (ibid.) For Weber as well as for previo
th
 
We have seen that in the human self as Weber conceives of it, two sides struggle with each 
other (whereas the third, the conscience, does not take sides): On the one hand we have the 
human who uses her will, who has emotions and desires, who follows values and wishes, all
of which are subjective. On the other hand there is the thinker who uses her intellect to test 
arguments, construct concepts and organise reality into categories, with the help of l
will is constrained by the rational side of the self, which stands for self-control and 
abstinence, almost like impulse control. Weber sees this rational purification as character
of Western civilisation and modern science. The relation between the intellect and the 
passions is in some respects similar to one we find in another German-speaking intellectual of
the time: Sigmund Freud. By 1908, Weber had read the major works by Freud. Both t
very much stress the importance of personal conviction, and also that a fundamental 
existential condition of humanity is that we orientate in and make sense of our world through 
ascribing meaning to it. (Strong 1987) Cornelius Castoriadis points out that Freud conceived 
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of psychical reality as consisting of a multiplicity. ‘Now, the latter was seen by Freud not as a
“subject” but as a plurality of subjects. He spoke about a multiplicity of “psychical persons”,
“intrapsychic” conflicts between opposing “instances”’. (Castoriadis 1997: 141) For Freu
passions are something which must always be constrained in order for civilisation to be 
possible. There is a clear hierarchy within the self, where reason must stay the undisputed 




leashed nor suppressed entirely, since that would result in 

















Before the idea of an internally differentiated subject having conflicts between parts of t
self, the self could not be posed as a threat to knowledge, and scientific objectivity (i.e. 
negating parts of the subject) was unnecessary and unthinkable as a scientific virtue. (Dasto
& Galison 2007: ch. 4) Freud was not the origin of the notion of an internal battle betw
mental faculties, although he became the most famous exponent of such ideas. Some 
similarities between them are striking. In Weber we also find a multiplicity within the self
and it is important that the subordination of emotions under reason is not constant. These 
warring sides both have a field of their own where they properly belong. In science, the self 
constrains those aspects of itself which are improper. In politics, they are let loose. In fact, it
is even one’s duty to follow the passions in politics. Everyone should speak their own mind 
and fight for the values they believe in; passionately serving the cause they have chosen.
modernity, the threat has arisen of the soulless specialist who has no values and merely 
operates according to standards of instrumental rationality. Just as for Freud, if the rational 
aspect of the self completely suppresses the emotional one, the result will be pathological
Remember that both Leidenschaft (passion, fervour) and the existential value-choice are 
necessary presuppositions for science. For Weber, the passions are a driving force. They 
motivate all life projects, even that of science. Emotions are a prerequisite for rational science,
not an antithesis to it. This was a rare standpoint at the time. In this respect, Weber’s account 
squares nicely with the findings of Damasio referred to in chapter 2, showing how emotion
motivate rational thinking. (Damasio 1999) The scientist must have passion and values in 
order to do his job, but he must not confound these with science. The thinking intellect sho
have a firm grip of emotions and motives. Passions cannot be eradicated, yet must rema
under strict control while inside the sphere of science. The self must remain w
d
 
Background assumptions about the objects of study and about the normal order of things 
affect the way science is practiced. (Sismondo 1996, Longino 1990) It is very hard to separate 
culture from science when it comes to these more or less subconscious beliefs. Every scientist 
starts with a view of reality handed to her by the culture where she was socialised, and whi
directs scientific enterprises. On the reverse, several notions that were first only scientific 
have now become part of our culture and everyday way of seeing the world. Think e.g. of 
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Newtonian space, the Freudian unconscious or, to take an older example, the discovery that
the heart is a pump and not an oven. In Weber’s case, early 20th century culture harboured 
different background assumptions about the human self, than in the mid-19th century. This 
shift in background assu
 
mptions led Weber to advocate a very different objectivity than the 






eber connected to his views 








ves. This fact is highly significant for 
nderstanding the logic of Weber’s objectivity. 
4.3 The Puritan connection 
In The Protestant Ethic, Weber extensively analyses the Lutheran concept of Beruf. In 
contemporary German it has the meaning of ‘profession’ or ‘vocation’, but it originally h
the meaning of ‘calling’ (from God). Luther generalised the calling to apply not only to 
clerical groups but to everyone. Every person was called unto to do her duty (Pflicht) an
serve God. This was done through carrying out the tasks associated with the position in 
society she occupied. The duty of serving God became transformed into worldly hard work. 
That is why the meaning of the term eventually changed. (PE). Also in Weber’s own thinking,
the notion of calling plays a major role. Harvey Goldman points out that Weber’s secularised 
version of the calling is heavily influenced by Calvinist Puritanism, where it has a much more
ascetic nature. It places stern moral demands on the person to assume responsibili
the self into a dutiful character with a project. Weber saw a need to ‘return to the 
“individualism” of life in the calling as a response to the collapse of a shared, or “collective” 
sense of meaning in life. (Goldman 1988: 49) The calling is for W
o
 
Since Weber sees ethics as formal, he does not believe that it in itself can tell us how to act.
That depends on the nature of our chosen calling. The artist, the scientist and the politician 
have all accepted different callings and are thus compelled to act differently. Every calling 
brings an ethical duty to be fulfilled well. Weber uses the word Beruf in the double sense
also the English ‘vocation’ still has. Even though he takes the notion of the calling from 
Luther, there is one major difference between them. For Luther, the calling came from God. 
Every person was called upon to fulfil her duty to God. Weber transforms the concept so tha
its ethical form – the ethos and duty of the calling – remains, but it is no longer given from 
outside. Instead we choose our own callings, using our conscience. The duty to work ha
serve remains, but is no longer directed towards God but to the ultimate value we have 
chosen. This is an essential part of our autonomy; forming ourselves into unique indiv
To choose the calling is to choose what aim and purpose life should have. This is the 
fundamental value-choice in each person’s life, which science cannot perform but only help
clarify. The term ‘Beruf’ has changed its meaning from Luther to Weber, since we are not 
called to our vocations – to the cause we dutifully serve – but choose them ourselves. W




Weber explicitly describes science as a calling, using a religiously loaded vocabulary. His
explication of the virtue of objectivity may be seen in the light of religious development, 
especially Protestant Puritanism. There are strong affinities between the objective scientist 
and the puritan devotee. Both are driven by a calling, a commitment to a higher cause that 
greatly surpasses them. Both should subject themselves to a harsh regime of self-discipline,
practicing abstinence and keeping close check on their inner life. Both should stay humble 
before this cause and not fall prey to the hubris of elevating their own person. The sci
chooses her cause and serves it ceaselessly, just as the religious devotee chooses her 
denomination. Weber repeatedly calls different ultimate values ‘gods’, which are to be ser
One should live one’s life consistently and in accordance with the faith that one follows, 
regardless of whether this is a religious faith or not. The sphere of the sacred (whether i
science or religion) should be kept pure and not be contaminated by personal interests, 
commercial matters or political struggles. We see here similar views concerning the idea
and its opposite. The cognitive conduct of both Weber’s objective scientist and puritan 
devotees is characterised by the ascetic virtue of abstinence. The first group abstains from 
value-judgments and the second from pleasure. What value-judgments and pleasure have in 
common is that they both derive from the passions, and can be understood as self-indulgence. 







bject of devotion, the God that the 
ithful ones serve. Uncontrolled passion is a cardinal sin. fa
 
Virtuous self     Vicious self  
Dedicated to the calling   Ruled by the passions 
Self-abnegating    Self-indulgent 
Strict control of inner mental life  Falling prey to whims and fancies 






e, religious virtues and ideals of 
personhood are transformed into their scientific counterparts. 
Hard working     Lazy 
H
 
Weber was fascinated by religion, even though he never considered himself religious. (Ri
2004) Paul Honigsheim, who knew Weber in person, witness of his admiration and dee
respect for religious life. (Honigsheim 1968) Puritan asceticism occupied a prominent 
position in Weber’s writings, not least in his most famous work, The Protestant Ethic and th
Spirit of Capitalism. Weber understands the duty of the ethical life in terms borrowed
Luther and other branches of Protestantism. Doris Bosch shows that also his ideal of 
objectivity was strongly influenced by Puritanism. She argues that Weber’s position should b
understood as scientific asceticism, directly influenced by Puritan asceticism. The two have 
similar forms but different aims. (Bosch 1962) In Weber’s cas
4.4 Chapter summary 
In Weber’s time, background assumptions about the self had changed since the heydays of 
objectivity around 1850. That is one major reason why his objectivity looks different from 
earlier naturalistic versions. Though it also has the form of negating aspects of the subject, it 
answers to different threats. The aim is no longer knowledge untainted by every aspect of the 
self, but knowledge untainted by the evaluative aspect. As Weber sees it, there is a plurality 
within the self. The self is divided into intellect, conscience and emotions. Between intellect 
and emotions there is an irreconcilable tension, a struggle that can never be resolved. All 
three must be present in the flourishing human being, yet the aspect of the self which is 
emotional, evaluative and political must be severely restrained within science. Objectivity 
requires a passion for the truth. The objective scientist has a passion for the calling and the 
area of study, but acts with self-distance and controls emotions. There must be harsh 
discipline: Self-abnegation and not indulgence. Weber’s view of proper scientific conduct is 
infused with Puritan values. When attempting to understand why Weber’s conceived of 
objectivity the way he did, one important part of the puzzle is the Puritan view of the self and 
the calling. Weber wished to ban cultural values from scientific practice. Yet it seems cultural 
values take part in shaping the scientific values that guide scientific practice. Weber’s model 
for the scientific self partly derives from the outside of science, from the cultural current of 
Puritanism. However, when Puritan asceticism is adopted into science, it is transformed in the 
process. Weber’s scientific self is not an exact copy of the Puritan ascetic, but a modified 
version adapted to the inside of science. The scientific life presents other demands and 
restraints than the religious life. When cultural values become scientific values, they are no 
longer the same. 
 
As will soon become clear, Weber combines the ethical vision of the calling, which includes 
the duty to serve in a self-abnegating manner, with the ethical vision of Bildung as self-
formation and autonomy. That is why we choose our own callings and then serve them. This 
is part of the ethical task of self-formation and creating a unique individuality. The next 
chapter will look closer at the roles of ethics and politics in Weber’s thinking, and examine 
how these fit together with Weber’s views on science and the self. 
 
 
5. Society: Objectivity and social order 
 
After having examined Weber’s views of science and the self, we now turn to society. To 
understand what it means to be an objective researcher, we need to examine also how Weber 
viewed the relationship between science and politics. In this chapter we look closer at the 
political and existential concerns related to Weber’s view of objectivity. This will tell us what 
type of fears that drive the methodology. What does the Weberian anxiety consist of?  
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5.1 The agonism of politics 
The distinction between ethics and politics 
Ethics precedes politics. Ethical questions are not questions of cultural values but are 
apolitical. Weber explicitly demarcates ethics from cultural values (and thus from politics). 
The two value-spheres are not identical. Unlike value-judgements, ethical propositions may 
be valid. An example of a valid ethical norm would be the duty to serve the chosen calling. 
The validity of ethics does not bear on ‘social-political problems’, and so does not 
recommend specific ends or actions. On its own, ethics cannot tell us how to act. (GAW 504, 
MSS 15) Ethical questions have valid answers, but they do not unambiguously guide us in 
real-life situations. Only in matters of pure reflection, untainted by reality, may we come up 
with unequivocal ethical answers that attain validity. According to Weber, ethics in itself 
cannot tell us how to live. Even within ethics there is a tension between the ethics of 
conviction (Gesinnungsethik, acting with regard to a value) and the ethics of responsibility 
(Verantwortungsethik, acting with regard to the consequences). Although these often stand in 
opposition and have incompatible groundings, both of them should be present in the ethical 
life. These two types of ethics are complementary. Every person has to weigh values and 
consequences against each other, and there can be no rule to tell us how this should be done. 
(GPS 448-49, VOP 93-94) This means that there is an agonistic plurality (see below) also 
within ethics, although the plurality contains only two elements. Furthermore, Weber says 
that ethics and cultural values relate to each other as form to content. Ethical norms have a 
formal character and need to be “filled” with the specific content of cultural values in order to 
guide action. (GAW 148, VOP 97)21 It follows from ethics that everybody has a duty to serve 
their calling, regardless of which cause they have chosen. Weber’s idea of ethics is clearly 
influenced by Immanuel Kant: Ethics has a formal character, and so stays neutral with respect 
to substantial values. It prescribes what form duty takes, but not its content. Ethical norms are 
valid for all, irrespective of culture. Ethics does not contain value-judgements. 
 
Ethics (conscience) prescribes that every individual chooses an ultimate value to believe in. 
Weber uses the following more or less synonymous terms to designate that which is chosen: 
Ultimate value; value-axiom; “god”; cause; calling; faith. He states that every person has to 
decide what she considers to be the god (or value-axiom) worth following, and that may well 
be the “devil” for another. (GAW 604, VOP 31) Since reason cannot dictate which ultimate 
value or cause to serve, being called by them is a matter of faith. Different world-views or 
value-orientations (Weltanschauungen) are caught in an eternal political struggle, and we 
have to make choice between them. (GAW 608, GPS 436, VOP 35, 82-83) 
 
                                                 
21 If this is hard to understand, think of the relation between them as similar to that between hardware and 
software. Computer hardware on its own has no direction, no task, no meaning, yet it is the inescapable form 
which all software must conform to. The program uses the hardware to outline specific actions. 
The irreconcilable struggle between values 
The different callings that we choose in life cannot be reconciled or combined in any simple 
way, since they operate according to different inherent logics. (GAW 494, MSS 5) Weber 
says: ‘Life is an unceasing struggle of these gods with one another. Or speaking directly, the 
ultimately possible attitudes toward life are irreconcilable, and hence their struggle can never 
be brought to a final conclusion. Thus it is necessary to make a decisive choice.’ (MSS 31, 
GAW 608) 
 
Several commentators, among them David Owen, claim that Weber adopted this view of 
existential struggle from Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche believed that incompatible views of 
the world were locked in a battle that could not be resolved by reason. (Owen 1994) However, 
Bruun argues that only the type of problems that occupied Weber were Nietzschean, but not 
the answers that he gave. (Bruun 2007: 41) Weber was slightly more optimistic than 
Nietzsche. Science can provide clarity to facilitate the making of life choices. It clarifies not 
only matters of fact, but also relations of values, making clearer the ultimate meaning inherent 
in actions. It can tell us what values and meanings that different actions and utterances 
harbour. Science helps others make their own choices, but cannot itself say which choices are 
valuable. (GAW 607, VOP 34) Weber’s view of politics could be described as agonism. It 
stresses pluralism and conflict or tension, and sees both these elements as ineradicable and 
positive. The world would be a poorer place without this plurality. 
 
Even if there is a plurality of “gods”, there are also false gods. (Götzen) Weber rejects some 
values which he means are simply superficial and poorly reasoned. (GAW 591, VOP 17) 
They do not live up to the standards of genuine callings and cannot function as value-axioms. 
Mere opinions or unreflected judgements are not worth as much. Only those ultimate values 
which truly express a person’s active choice can legitimately take part in the struggle of 
values. The plurality of values seems to apply only to those values which are pondered upon 
and freely chosen. Ringer says that ’Weber admired autonomous individuals who act upon 
carefully considered principles.’ (Ringer 2004: 57) Values that people hold without thinking 
or merely because someone told them to, are not worthy of the same respect. Weber says: 
‘The fruit of the tree of knowledge consists in the insight that every single important activity 
and ultimately life as a whole, if it is not to be permitted to run on as an event in nature but is 
instead to be consciously guided, is a series of ultimate decisions through which the soul … 
chooses its own fate, i.e., the meaning of its activity and existence.’ (MSS 18; GAW 507-8, 
emphasis in German original)  
 
The aim of science (and teaching) is to clarify to others what exactly their ideals actually 
imply: consequences, consistencies, contradictions. Science shall thereby make it easier for 
people to make their own value-judgments as political citizens. Weber is clear that this 
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applies particularly to teachers. By prescribing political opinions to students, their autonomy 
is denied and they are encouraged to become spineless followers. (GAW 489-91, MSS 1-4) 
 
Bildung and values versus utility and self-interest 
Political questions are for Weber always questions of power. (Lassman 2000) The means of 
politics is violence. (GPS 397, VOP 40). This is perhaps not too surprising, since Weber 
leaves little room for reason and arguments within politics. However, it is important to note 
that politics is not primarily the struggle for personal interests, but for personal values. Those 
who live up to the standards of ethics do not fight for their own benefit but for the faith of 
their choice. Politics is a battle not between self-interests, but between ‘ultimate values’. 
Weber sometimes talks of conflicting interests, but often reverts to the language of values 
when he discusses politics. Even though the arena of politics involves violence and emotions, 
this battle is not fought between egoistic utility maximizers who all try to further their own 
self-interest, but between the followers of different gods. The aim of life is not happiness or 
utility, but to live in accordance with a value that has been freely and actively chosen. In 
science as well as in politics we can clearly see Weber’s vision of autonomy. This goal of 
autonomy is seen by Weber as a (valid) ethical norm and not as a cultural value, thus standing 
outside of political debate. 
 
At the time when Weber lived, German Kultur was generally set in opposition to British 
Civilisation. The latter was seen as egoistic, individualistic and aimed only at utility. It was 
devoid of the cultivation, genuine values and unique cultural ideals that the German nation 
stood for. (Boglind, Eliaeson & Månson 1993: 113, Eliaeson 2000: 138) ‘Weber shared much 
of this, notably the sense of a distinctive national cultural mission that required a strong state.’ 
(Eliaeson 2000: 138) According to Fritz Ringer, Weber was deeply influenced by the German 
tradition of Bildung. To achieve Bildung was to cultivate oneself, growing in both moral and 
cultural sensibility and aiming for ‘the development of an incomparable individual’. Every 
person should find her own way, making herself unique. Along with this came a positive 
valuation of both individual and cultural diversity. (Ringer 1997: 9) The German tradition of 
Bildung is explicitly against the notion of utility, which is always a means for something else. 
Humans should instead strive for Bildung, which is an end in itself. (Kjørup 1999: 66-7) The 
soulless specialist whom Weber warns against in the Protestant Ethic (PE 86) may be 
described as having lost all values except that of utility. Some of the meanings of Bildung 
include education, learning, edification, self-determination, and self-formation. These ideals 
are clearly present in Weber’s thinking. It was of great importance to him that each person 
should be allowed to choose her own destiny. (GAW 507-8, MSS 18) To make this value-
choice was at once to form and to express one’s unique character. The positive valuation of 
autonomy as Bildung informed also his views on science, the university and the German 
nation, as will become clear below. 
 47
 
Ethics as the formal basis of science and politics 
In the sphere of culture and politics, values and self-formation are played out, as opposed to 
the sphere of science. To say what is desirable, good or valuable; to recommend action; to 
give normative or practical evaluations - these all fall outside the realm of science in Weber’s 
eyes. Politics takes a stand on what ends are worth pursuing. That is what science must not 
do. Science may only clarify matters and give advice on means, not say what goals are worth 
striving for. Every person must herself make the value-choice of what the telos of her life is. 
Weber is very much concerned that the boundary between facts and values should not be 
transgressed. The distinction is held up, not just as a neutral piece of information, but as 
something which any rational person should stick to in practice. It is a prerequisite for proper 
knowledge. Political struggles should not be let into science, nor should science portray itself 
as capable of solving value-conflicts or proving what is right. What is most important is that 
value-judgements are not presented as scientific statements.  
 
Weber recommends scientific action and prescribes what should be done or not. In other 
words, he first states a logical fact and then draws a normative conclusion about action. He 
moves from stating an is to recommending an ought; precisely what value-freedom forbids. 
On first look, it would then appear as if Weber himself has violated the principle which he 
argues to uphold. However, this is not necessarily the case. The principle of value-free 
science is a methodological principle, and not itself a piece of science. Methodology normally 
does not apply to itself. Weber only prescribes scientific action. He outlines what follows for 
those who have chosen the value-sphere of science. As mentioned above, there is no rational 
justification for science itself. Science is a calling where knowledge is sought for its own 
sake. It serves no other purpose than itself. If knowledge seeking was motivated by another 
value than truth, science would only be a means to another end. (GAW 592, 599, VOP 19, 25) 
A positive evaluation of science rests upon a previous value-choice: To value truth. Scientists 
have chosen to serve the cause (or “god”) of empirical science. To accept the calling of 
science entails accepting the principle of value-freedom. It is part of the package of seeking 
truth in a rational manner. Recommending it in action is thus part of the formal preconditions 
which precede any scientific investigation. 
 
 Logical fact 1: Facts and values are ‘logically heterogeneous’. 
 Logical fact 2: It is logically invalid to deduce practical conclusions from facts. 
Practical conclusion: Scientists must respect this logical gap in their practice  
 
It is here important to remember the role of ethics in Weber’s cosmology. Ethics is purely 
formal and prescribe that everyone does their duty in serving their ultimate values, no matter 
what the substance of these are. Weber is well aware that it is valuational to argue that science 
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and politics should not be mixed. It is a value-choice to decide to adhere to the principle of 
value-freedom and thus not mixing up facts and values or science and politics, but it is a 
value-choice which precedes any scientific activity. It comes as part of the package of 
empirical science. Those who choose the value-sphere of empirical science must follow its 
inherent logic. Serving the cause of science includes respecting the ideal of value-freedom. 
Science is in itself evaluative, but only insofar as it values truth and value-freedom. Science 
cannot stay neutral towards itself. No activity can be performed well unless it is valued by the 
persons practicing it. Weber sees value-freedom (and the previous value-choice that it entails) 
as a prerequisite for performing good science. The substantial value-choice is to accept the 
scientific calling. Once that choice has been made, the formal (ethical) duty in this case 
prescribes that the scientist behaves in a value-free manner. In Weber’s solution, values do 
not play a part in scientific activity, only as a prerequisite. The idea of duty as formal is 
essential in establishing this. 
5.2 The politics of objectivity 
The value-ladenness of value-freedom 
When Weber was still alive, the state was dictating internal university affairs, while at the 
same time university lecturers spoke out on politics, recommending policy for the state. The 
fact that university lecturers were outspoken on politics was seen as a reason for the state to 
decide who should be allowed to hold university positions. Socialists and anarchists were 
banned from the university. In 1917, Weber publishes the essay The meaning of ‘value-
freedom’ in the sciences of sociology and economics, where he further elaborates his ideas on 
objectivity as value-freedom, first put forth in the essay from 1904. Whereas the first paper 
focused more on epistemology, this one emphasises also the institutional situation: the role of 
the teacher; the relation between state and university; the role of science in society. Weber 
advances his position on Wertfreiheit in a time when the relation between the state and the 
university was hotly debated. How much freedom should be given to the universities? What is 
the relation between science and politics? Weber had a strong engagement in the matter, held 
public speeches, lectures and wrote many articles in the newspapers. (Josephson 2005:193) 
Do science and politics belong together? Weber fought hard both within the academy and on 
the political arena to make it very clear that they do not. He wished to safeguard the autonomy 
of the universities. The state should not interfere in academic business, nor should teachers 
and researchers utter opinions about politics. The two spheres should be separated. The state 
clearly demarcated from the universities, and politics from science. He draws a sharp line 
between the inside and outside of science.  
 
Weber says only a few people can become scientists, but every citizen of the state has a duty 
to partake in politics. This means that everyone acts within the sphere of politics, fighting for 
their own standpoint, but only a small group acts within the sphere of science. To become a 
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scientist is hard and requires training, experience and devotion, not to mention talent and 
intelligence. Within the university, the standards of politics and state should not rule. There 
we follow reason, evidence and good arguments. University matters should not be decided 
from the outside by the state or democracy, but are matters for an aristocracy of mind/spirit. 
(Geistesaristokratische Angelegenheit). (GAW 587, VOP 14) That is why even political 
enemies of the (conservative) state, such as socialists, should be allowed to hold university 
positions. (GAW 496, MSS 7) In Weber’s eyes, political motives contain cultural values and 
are therefore illegitimate within science. Since science cannot be a neutral arbiter choosing 
between values, politics must be kept outside of science, and vice versa. However, several 
commentators agree that there are political motives for the very postulate of value-freedom, 
since the separation between state and university (entailed by the principle of value-freedom) 
is so clearly political. It seems clear that the motives for Weber’s version of objectivity do not 
only concern proper knowledge, but also morals and politics. 
 
Since the postulate of value-freedom is motivated by practical concerns – political and moral 
issues – Willhelm Hennis argues that it is therefore not methodological at all. Against what he 
calls the “orthodox” view that value-freedom has to do with scientific methodology, he argues 
that value-freedom should be understood as a ‘practical maxim for keeping a clear head, for 
ensuring the impartiality of the scientist’. (Hennis 1994: 115) It is not about science but 
values, clearly situated in contemporary German culture and society. There is a strong ethos 
in the writings. The texts on objectivity and value-freedom, which allegedly deal with 
methodological problems, actually deal with ‘questions such as intellectual accountability, 
clarity, and awareness of the responsibility of the acting individual.’ (Hennis 1994: 118) For 
Hennis, these are not proper methodological questions and to believe so is a great 
misunderstanding. According to Bruun, Hennis is almost alone in holding this view among 
scholars studying Weber. ‘[W]ithout the principle of value freedom and the idea of a value-
free science, there would be little left of Weber’s methodology.’ (Bruun 2007: 11) 
Furthermore, all methodological principles can best be understood as normative, as values, 
and that does not make them less rational. If all methodologies are practical maxims – virtues 
which guide action – Hennis’s distinction between evaluative ethos-infused texts and rational 
methodology collapses. However, we may still draw on the point he makes: that political and 
moral issues are massively entangled in Weber’s objectivity and value-freedom.  
 
According to Peter Josephson, Weber has three main political motives for value-freedom in 
science: 
• To abolish the ideologically motivated discrimination that forbids ‘enemies of the 
state’ to hold university positions. 
• To keep the internal unity of the university and not let it fragmentise into warring 
factions driven by different ideologies. If that happens it cannot fulfil one of its most 
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important functions at the time: Clarify issues of values in order to educate and 
strengthen the confused and fragmented German nation.  
• Protect students from ideological indoctrination. They should develop autonomy in 
order to choose for themselves. (Josephson 2005:144-46) 
 
We see here how Weber’s concern for Bildung and autonomy meets his nationalism, in 
motivating value-freedom. In order for the state to stay strong it must not control the 
universities, since that hinders clarification and the capacity for self-formation. The next two 
sections show what implications the politics of objectivity-as-value-freedom has on the 
institutional and the personal levels. 
 
Institutional level: The boundary politics of science  
It is a fairly common idea in dialectical (Hegel-inspired) thinking that things are partly 
defined by not being something. Many entities are defined in opposition to what one could 
call their constitutive other. What makes something into what it is, are not only those things 
which are present but also those that are absent; not only the inside in itself but also the 
outside. We find this idea among such diverse thinkers as Roy Bhaskar, Theodor Adorno, 
Jacques Derrida and Jean-Paul Sartre. As an illustration, it is essential to the identity of any 
nation that there is an outside: those that do not belong to the nation. If no one was excluded 
from the inside, there would be no inside. (Hylland Erikssen 2002) The constitutive other of 
objectivity is subjectivity. As we have seen, with different outsides to objectivity (different 
aspects of the subject negated) we get different types of objectivity. The same is true for 
science in general. What science is depends on what it is defined in opposition to. For Weber, 
the constitutive other of science is politics. This does not mean that science and politics do not 
have anything to do with each other; quite the contrary. Exactly because they have so much to 
do with each other, it is essential to both activities that they remain separate. The absence of 
politics within science is an important part of what defines science as science. Of course many 
other things are also absent, but they are not significant absences to its identity. Politics on the 
other hand is a significant absence, helping define what science is. It is a constitutive absence. 
 
Europe in the 17th century saw an increasing differentiation between social spheres. The areas 
we today conceive of as science, politics and religion were previously much more 
intermeshed. In the 18th century, the most significant absence for science was religion. 
Science gained its identity primarily by being contrasted against religion. (Gaukroger 2006) 
Nearly two centuries later, religion had long since been separated from science and no longer 
posed a threat to its integrity and identity. In relation to each other they both had full integrity 
and no one “confused” them. No one preached in the lecture halls and church officials no 
longer told universities what to do. Scientists had no business in churches just as priests had 
no business in universities. But the main political institution – the state – was meddling in 
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university business. And on the reverse, scholars offered their opinions about the field of 
politics, recommending goals and actions and prescribing policy. 
 
Against this background, we may understand Weber’s efforts as continuing the functional 
differentiation and specialisation of social spheres that is often seen as one of the defining 
characteristics of modernity. Weber’s move is one of increasing the integrity of the scientific 
sphere and severing some of the connections to the sphere of politics. They have a strict 
division of labour between them. Science was to belong solely within the university, which 
politics was to be excluded from. The means to demarcating science from politics is the 
methodological principle of Wertfreiheit. In order to make science free from political 
prescriptions, Weber must prescribe a certain political order.  
 
There are several questions which any political community must answer. Who is allowed to 
speak? What is a political act (as opposed to e.g. criminal, religious or scientific acts)? What 
is a legitimate political question? What is the means of politics? The answers to these 
questions are simultaneously formal preconditions of politics and substantial political issues 
possible to contest and debate. In Weber’s case, questions of expertise, i.e. logic and facts, fall 
outside of the political realm. They belong within the sphere of science. Weber hides his 
political ideals of institutional differentiation in plain sight, by framing them as the formal 
preconditions for all of politics. The question of how to draw the line between science and 
politics is defined as a non-political question. Sheila Jasanoff, writing about the different 
ways that science has been demarcated from politics, concludes: ‘Since these boundary-
defining terms affect the allocation of power, their meaning cannot be established 
independently of the political process.’ (Jasanoff 1987: 226) Through boundary work, Weber 
attempts to redraw the scientific-political-cultural map, simultaneously separating facts from 
values, science from politics and universities from the state. Drawing the boundaries for 
politics and other elements of society, including ethics, is itself political. Marking the 
boundaries of politics is a highly political activity. Stating what is politically legitimate, or 
what belongs within the realm of politics, are political statements. An answer to the question 
‘What is the political?’ can not be given outside of all political struggles. This implies that 
regardless of whether scientific practice is political and value-laden, at least the boundary-
making aspect of methodology is. 
 
Weber can be seen as doing what Bruno Latour calls purification. To purify and separate two 
areas from each other requires conceptual work, changing meanings, as well as changes in 
practices and concrete connections. (Latour 1993) As a result we get two distinct areas: 
Science and politics. They appear to be ontologically different, functioning according to 
different principles and logics. Once Weber is finished there seems to be no values or 
questions of power inside of science, just as there is no rationality or reasonable arguments 
 52
within politics. Through the boundary work of his methodological writings and political 
actions, Weber aimed to recast the form of society and establish a new social order. This 
would not only have separated the institutions of state and university, also had deep 
cosmological implications, differentiating fields of reality from each other. Even though he 
failed to accomplish this in his time, his ideas later bore fruit and has today become 
commonplace.  
 
Personal level: Agonistic pluralism and aristocratic autonomy 
David Owen argues that the struggle for autonomy is of essential importance to Weber, and 
that it motivates most of his empirical investigations. They should be understood as attempts 
at furthering autonomy, by increasing the clarity and self-understanding central to choosing 
our own destinies. Since human is a historical and cultural being, the cultural sciences can 
provide better self-understanding. The Protestant Ethic is a prime example of this. A better 
understanding of how we came to be the ones we are, as well as of the significance, value-
relations and probable consequences of our practices, will help furthering our autonomy. 
(Owen 1994) For this clarification of value-relations and the probable consequences of 
values-standpoints to be possible, the researcher needs to uphold the principle of value-
freedom. Value-freedom is thus essential for realising autonomy, the capacity to choose one’s 
own values and create one’s own destiny. It seems Weber provides a formalistic account of 
the good life, which stays neutral with respect to the substantial content. He remains a value-
pluralist, since he clearly distinguishes ethics from cultural values. Clarity and self-
understanding (for which value-freedom is a prerequisite) is needed in order for them to 
autonomously choose their own values. This is part of the formal character of ethics. Since for 
Weber, the formal duty of choice concerns ethics and not cultural values, he remains value-
neutral (on his own terms). All this shows that Weber’s view of scientific objectivity is 
intrinsically linked to his view of the good life. What we have here is a case of a scientific 
value (inside of science) being motivated by and linked to a cultural value (outside of 
science).  
 
Weber’s own political position is not all too easy to pin down. Fritz Ringer describes him as a 
value-pluralist. (Ringer 2004: 5) He certainly was not a conservative, even though he had 
strong nationalist values. He expressed at least partial sympathy with social democracy. 
(Proctor 1991:138, 121) Boglind et al describes his position as ‘national liberalism’, arguing 
that the nationalist struggle to unify and foster the weak and fragmented German state was his 
main political priority. (Boglind, Eliaeson & Månson 1993: 121, 128, 130) Several 
interpreters see him as a liberal due to his outspoken pluralism, although he does not share the 
utilitarian view of the self that is most often associated with liberalism. He also stressed the 
element of conflict much more than liberal thinkers normally do, focussing instead on 
tolerance. Weber’s pluralism could be described as agonistic, stressing the enduring character 
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of value-struggles, and the positive effect this might have. He does not believe that the tension 
between different political views could ever be resolved, or that it should be. Without a 
plurality of competing values the world would be a poorer place. Sven Eliaeson claims that he 
was not dedicated to liberalism as a set of universal principles. He also dismissed the 
liberalism of John Stuart Mill as resting upon metaphysical views he did not share. His views 
were far more aristocratic. 
 
He was a liberal in the sense of being deeply concerned about the individual as an autonomous 
cultural being, a value that was not shared by contemporary socialism. But he did not defend this 
as a universal principle, much less design a state that made the protection of individual 
autonomy into a general goal for the population as a whole. Indeed he did not think that this was 
feasible for ordinary people, governed by the necessity of making a living, though he did attempt 
to preserve the possibility of autonomous action and autonomous life for the few how could 
work out the material conditions for autonomy. This was an aristocratic notion of autonomy 
rather than a principled universalistic one. (Eliaeson 2000: 137) 
 
Who had the means for forming themselves, developing unique personalities and choosing 
their own destinies, in the way that Weber conceived of? It is no secret that the tradition of 
Bildung that so influenced Weber’s thinking is a bourgeois tradition, harboured by the 
cultivated upper middle class. The forming of selves is not a politically innocent matter. Both 
science and Bildung were male areas. Beverley Skeggs writes that in the 19th and 20th 
centuries, self-control and autonomy were mainly masculine ideals, as well as bourgeois ones. 
 
The individualism which is assumed in a great deal of theorizing on subjectivity is the product 
of, and in the interests of, privileged groups in very specific historical and national 
circumstances. The project of the self is a Western bourgeois project. (Skeggs 1997: 163) 
 
If objectivity is primarily motivated by safeguarding the possibility of autonomy, and this 
autonomy is only for the wealthy few, this seems to suggest that Weber’s methodological 
ideal of objectivity-as-value-freedom in fact was meant to serve the interests of the cultivated 
middle class. However, it could do this only by securing that science was rational, objective 
and pure from politics. Science serves this particular political interest by being free from 
political interests. 
5.3 Chapter summary 
Ideals of the self and ideals of society are often connected. Ever since Plato’s Republic it has 
been a common thought that personal virtues are needed in order for the state to be virtuous. 
This idea is strong in the Christian tradition. In Weber’s view of science, the virtuous scientist 
makes possible a strong and unified state that also lets every citizen choose its own goal. 
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Objectivity as value-freedom is meant to guarantee autonomy in multiple ways: Autonomy 
for the activity of science vis-à-vis the activity of politics, autonomy for the universities as 
social institutions free from state involvement, for the nation as a whole and finally the 
facilitation of individual autonomy for people choosing their values and destinies. Autonomy 
is thus played out in three areas – science (level of practice), society (institutional level) and 
the self (individual level). Autonomy should here not be understood in the reductive sense of 
independence, but rather as the more encompassing notion of self-determination: To 
consciously and actively form oneself, in the spirit of German Bildung. Science is needed to 
provide Bildung to the nation and to society; clarification in order to allow for self-formation. 
This cannot be achieved unless scientific objectivity is respected. 
 
The Weberian anxiety does not only motivate why the researcher should be objective, but also 
how. Weber’s explication of objectivity is part of his attempt to demarcate science from 
politics. If Weber’s objectivity is interpreted too narrowly, one sees only a part of the work 
that this concept performs. It is through the virtue of objectivity that Weber’s existential aims 
are secured. It aims not only at guaranteeing good science, but also at safeguarding the 
autonomy of both persons and universities, plus fostering a strong nation. Weber is doing 
boundary politics, defining the form of the modern scientifically informed state. A specific 
type of subject is needed, but also a specific type of institution. Weber’s advocacy of 
objectivity as value-freedom simultaneously articulates ideals of good scientific practice, the 
researching subject, the institution of science and of the institution of politics. Objectivity 
defines not only the inside of science: what good science is and how the researcher should 
behave. It is connected to a whole cosmological order, including normative ideals. Weber’s 
personal political and moral goals are present in shaping his methodology.  
 
 
6. Conclusion: The cosmology of Weber’s objectivity 
 
Hopefully, by now this study has illustrated the relevance of sociology to issues of 
epistemology. We can now see what the Weberian anxiety – the fear motivating objectivity – 
concerns. Weber fears confusion and mixture; logical, institutional and ontological. This 
would lead to a loss of clarity and autonomy.  
 
The scientific ideal of objectivity-as-value-freedom simultaneously embodies ideals of 
rationality, the self and society. Objectivity is not just about behaving in a proper manner or 
creating proper knowledge, it is also about creating the proper order in society. Objectivity-
as-value-freedom functions as a tool for boundary politics, aiming to reshape the institutional 
order of society and establish a strict functional differentiation between state and universities. 
Weber attempts to co-produce scientific and social order.  
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Weber exempts his goal of autonomy from political debate by framing it as a purely formal 
ethical issue, since ethics stands outside the struggle between cultural values. However, very 
few today would agree with the idea that a formal ethics is neutral with regard to both culture 
and values, and that duty is a value-free notion. From a contemporary perspective, the ethical 
vision of the scientific calling and the boundary politics it brings appear as clearly political. 
Even more so, since Weber actually did not see the goal of ‘the individual as an autonomous 
cultural being’ as applicable to all classes of society. (Eliaeson 2000: 137) 
 
It is common among English-speaking philosophers to believe that facts and values are 
dichotomous, just like Weber did. Beliefs are then assumed to be “purely factual” or 
“cognitive” and free from normative content. (Putnam 2002) These background assumptions 
about logic and language have been shown to be highly dubious. (see ch. 3) However, as long 
as they were accepted it was hard for philosophers to fully appreciate what anthropologists 
have been saying for a long time: Cosmological beliefs about the order of the world concern 
both what is true and what is good. Cosmological assumptions about e.g. the human self are 
also normative. (Sahlins 1996) There is presently a growing number of works that suggest 
that this applies also to scientific methodologies, although it would still remain an empirical 
question what the specific connections to values and wider cosmology are in any specific 
case. It is not clear beforehand if and how existential, moral and political concerns will affect 
a specific methodology.  
 
I have here performed a sociological investigation of scientific methodology. This study has 
shown some of the cultural values and beliefs present in the case of Weber’s methodology of 
objectivity-as-value-freedom. We have now found some of the background assumptions 
needed in order to render Weber’s methodology fully coherent and reasonable. Scientific 
order, mental order and social order are all connected within an encompassing cosmological 
order. The scientific value objectivity-as-value-freedom should be understood against in 
connection with these cosmological background assumptions: 
 
• Science, the human Self, Ethics and Politics are all characterised by internal agonistic 
relations. Each one contains a plurality of elements or perspectives that stand in 
irreconcilable tension to each other. 
• Politics is a field of power struggles between values and interests, performed through 
the means of emotions and violence. 
• Facts and values are dichotomous on both a logical and a semantic level. Language 
can be divided into evaluative and value-free terms. 
• Culture shapes human reality and ascribes significance to the fragments we perceive. 
Human interests, perspectives, and scientific problems are all cultural. 
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• The human self is a subject with inner depth, divided into mental categories that can 
stand in conflict. The intellect can momentarily suppress the emotions. 
• In view with the tradition of Bildung, the self is a cultural entity responsible for self-
formation and developing a unique and autonomous character. 
• The ethical notion of the calling becomes secularised and the duty to serve is extended 
to everyone. To autonomously choose one’s calling (destiny; ultimate value) is the 
goal of the ethical life. The validity of this goal rests upon a formal ethical norm and 
lies beyond political value-struggles. 
• Puritan asceticism is a model for the scientific calling. Empirical science presupposes 
that the value of truth is chosen. The scientist behaves in an ascetic manner, practicing 
self-abnegation and discipline in the service of truth. He should be passionately 
dedicated to the cause and therefore abstain from value-judgments and suppress his 
emotions. 
• Value-free science facilitates autonomy. It a) allows people their own choice by not 
confusing facts with values or descriptions with prescriptions, b) facilitates the choice 
by providing clarity, and c) helps to educate and strengthen the German nation.  
• In order for science to stay value-free, a certain social order is needed: functional 
differentiation and separation between the institutions of university and state, and 
between science and politics. 
 
Take away some of these assumptions, e.g. science as a ascetic calling or human being as a 
cultural being, and objectivity would no longer have the same form. That is why Weber’s 
objectivity differs from many accounts before and after him, as historical evidence shows. 
Also its validity as a scientific standard rest upon some of these assumptions.  
 
Main conclusion 
What has the case shown us? The primary function of objectivity-as-value-freedom is to 
safeguard the formal vision of the good life: Autonomously choosing one’s own ultimate 
values, calling, fate. The standards of objectivity and good science that Weber proposes are 
infused with existential, moral and political concerns and depend partly on their context of 
origin. His vision of objective science depends on factors normally classified as subjective.  
 
Howard Becker tells us that one way to generalise from a case study is to rephrase the 
findings on a higher level of abstraction. (Becker 1998: 125-8) In this case, I have found that 
non-scientific values become transformed into scientific values. Scientific values depend 
partly on cultural values, both in their origin and their validity. The outside determines not the 
full content, but the form of the inside. Do methodologies have politics? We have seen that 
concepts, questions and perspectives in a methodology are value-laden. Furthermore, in this 
case the inside also prescribes the form of the outside, the social order. Thus the inside also by 
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its very design performs outside functions; Weber’s methodology is to an extent political. 
Inside and outside appear to stand in a dialectical relationship, giving form to each other. 
Although Weber’s objectivity-as-value-freedom is sophisticated and insightful, it does not 
fully capture this complexity and some of its tenets no longer appear plausible. It seems 
Weber did not settle these matters once and for all. 
 
Further research 
Daston and Galison show how ideals of objectivity are connected to beliefs about the human 
self. Depending on the view of the self, objectivity will look different. The case of Weber 
confirms this. But Weber’s objectivity is not only connected to a specific view of the self, but 
also of society. This suggests that another ideal of objectivity would prescribe another self 
and another society. The question of how scientists should be objective is not a timeless 
question of mere rationality but connected to cultural and political issues. It would be very 
interesting to move on from Weber and see how themes of objectivity, value-freedom and 
politics are played out in other well-known accounts of these matters, such as those by the 
economists Gunnar Myrdal and Milton Friedman. 
 
 
List of abbreviations of Weber’s writings 
GASS = Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik 
GAW = Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre 
GPS = Gesammelte Politische Schriften 
MSS = The Methodology of the Social Sciences 
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